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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF THESIS 
11 The proposal of' a guaranteed annual wage is the biggest 
issue in labor-management relations since the union movement 
itself' came of' age.n Business Week editorialized in this 
manner on the eve of' the contract negotiations between the 
1 
United Automobile Workers (CIO) and the Ford Motor Company. 
A little more than one year later--June 2, 1956--
li d p 
II 
I 
I 
li 
II 
II 
• 
II 
II I Business Week had this to say: "There isntt much hazard in !! _,:....;____.;....__ -- II 
11 f'orecasting that this issue will. be majo~. in American industry',!! 
I employee relations f'or the next decade. tt 
1
/l 
I 
- L 
Certainly the guaranteed annual wage--or, as it is known 11 
!, 
today, supplemental unemployment compensation--has come to the I\ 
f'oref'ront in collective bargaining as the issue of' the day. 
As of' January, 1956 more than one million workers were covered 
I 
I 
I by some f'orm of' guaranteed annual wage. Recent negotiations in 1 
the steel industry have brought another 650,000 into play. 
While there are many industries and unions which have neither 
need nor desire f'or any guarantee, the signif'icant number of' 
I 
II 
II 
i! 
1 those which regard it as important makes it a subject worthy II 
II of' study. 
I While a great deal of' material has been written and 
disseminated on the issue itself', relatively little attention 
1 has been paid to the way in which employees in individual 
=!~-=-=-= 
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!!companies are being communicated to. The role of 11public rela-
1 ( 
I 
1 tionsn, whether called that or not by the company involved, has 
I ~ 
been under scrutiny to determine whether or not there is any 
I 
j tie-in between the action that a company takes when faced with 
this issue and its regular, day-to-day policy of employee 
relations .. 
~~ Q.ues1;1ons underlying this study are: Was the issue of' the 
jgu~ranteed annual wage (or any form of it} discussed at all 
!prior to eontract negotiations? Which employee groups did the 
i jcompany try to reach? To what extent was it felt by the manage-
! . 
~~ent that employees should be educated to better understanding 
1of the company•s position on the subject? In the case of 
I 
!companies which did not discuss the issue before negotiations, 
I hat was the nature of' subseg_uent announcements on the subject? 
1 A study such as this necessarily entailed looking into the 
I 
!!Philosophies of collective bargaining in the companies involved. 
ikether or not an organization makes a habit of' communicat:tng 
!lith employees on any collective bargaining issue naturally has 
! 
Ia bearing on its actions in a situation involving a guaranteed 
l
1
annual wage. 
11 The study was undertaken with the idea of formulating some 
ljconclusions on how the interests of employees are best served 
lrhen their union proposes a guarantee and a company must react 
1
1in some fashion or another. 
i 
j Five possible reactions of companies faced with this issue 
i jfere prop<~sed at first. Subsequent study made it necessary to 
' 
I 
1: 
i\ 
\: 
i 
I 
1\ 
il I 
3 'i 
ilcombine. several of these to reflect the actual situation 
)!prevalent in industry today. The original :rive approaches were:: II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1. Ii; is not the place of the company to communicate 
on the GAW to employees. 
2. Although there has been union pressure for a GAW, 
employees themselves are not convinced of its worth. 
There:rore, there is no problem. 
3. A program of work stabilization will eliminate any 
pressure for a GAW. This is the 11positive 11 approach. 
4. A company should oppose the issue vigorously through 
all possible channels of communication. 
5. The guaranteed annual wage, per se, is a good thing, 
but the plan under which it is to be carried out should 
j be submitted by ~anagement rather than the union. 
I Approach No. 2 as stated above proved untenable because 
lno company faced with GAW as a bargaining issue appeared to ~~~underestimate its importance or the impact of union pressure 
!(or its adoption. This was true whether or not the company 
Jlactually talked about it to employees. 
I 
I It.was decided not to discuss approach No.5 in any detail 
Jexcept in the background section when dealing with the 
[I" traditional" plans. This approach reflects the philosophy of l,~ompanies like Procter & Gamble, Hormel, and Nunn-Bush which 
l
[lsuccessi'ully initiated guarantee plans years ago. In addition, 
~tany of the companies which have recently installed GAW or SUB 
~ns actually modeled the i'inished product themselves. 
II 
II 
• 
~They did this, not so much because they wanted to, but because 
Junion pressure forced them to come up with a plan that was 
feasible. 
I The only voice which is being raised now in management 
I circles for an out and out guaranteed annual wage is that of 
4 
I !Harold J. Ruttenberg, now president of a small steel fabricating 
company and formerly an employee of the United Steelworkers of 
I -
1
.America. Mr. Ruttenberg is by no means typical of an approach 
land therefore, his views are not contained in the section of 
I , 
lithe thesis dealing with action by companies. Rather, his point 
I 
lof view is discussed in the section dealing with labor and 
!management feeling on the issue as a whole. 
J The timeliness of the topic made it necessary to search out 
lthe most recent analyses of the issue and much is just now being 
!!published and not available for study. Contact was made with 
imany of the companies which have, in the past year, signed 
I 
!contracts calling for some guarantee, be it of wages or 
I 
!!employment. The value of communications on this subject is 
ionly just being explored and much informational material is now 
lin the process of being produced and disseminated. 
I In the case of each company studied, an attempt was made to 
!find out what kinds of communications, if any, were issued 
I efore contract negotiations, and what was communicated after 
an agreement on a plan was reached. In each case it was 
necessary to look into the relative strength and positio~ of 
the union involved at the time of negotiations. It seems 
I' 
i' I 
·'I j 
II 
51 
11 significant that where 
I 
lor guarantees they did 
I 
companies were able to fight the adoption 
so because they were dealing either with I, 
'local unions or with situations where strong executives were 
able to successfully pit the power of management against 
I 
/!not-so-strong power of the union. 
i A study such as this naturally produces all kinds of 
I 
\second-guessing. Could an executive who succeeds in holding 
l1sway over the union with which he deals do the same with another 
!bigger union, and one with more determined leadership? What 
lwould have happened to the whole issue if it had come up this 
I 
i\year (1956) when the automobile companies would have been less 
\!afraid of a strike? Would the situation in the steel industry 
I . 
lbe different if Reuther had not succeeded in opening the door 
Ito supplementary unemployment benefits last year, and put David 
)~cDonald and the Steelworkers on the spot? 
ll These questions, while not properly having a place in this 
il 
:Jthesis, are a natural outcome of' an inquiry into the history and · 
j! !Philosophy of the guaranteed annual wage. Hand in hand with 
ilthese 11 poli tical 11 questions come such more pertinent ones as: 
II - . jwhat would have happened if the Ford Motor Company had carried 
\ion as extensive an educational campaign against GAW as did the 
,j 
I:U:I AW -CIO for it? 
These are the behind-the-scenes questions which may arise 
!~or the reader of this thesis. 
I• 
lkble, an attempt will be made to bring to light the conditions 
~revailing in companies concerned with this issue. 
======'~l====~============~===========================T====== 
While they are largely unanswer-
I 
II 
1 
2 
FOOTNOTES 
11 Special Report: GAW: The Showdown--The Meaning,tt Business 
Week, April 9; 1955, p. 188 
nA Tough First Test for SUB, 11 Business~, June 2, 1956, 
p. 54 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND OF THE GUARANTEED ANNUAL WAGE 
De~inition o~ Terms 
Every discussion o~ the move towards guarantee o~ wages, 
annual or otherwise, necessarily entails a definition o~ terms. 
What has been secured recently in many companies does not amount 
to a guarantee o~ 52 full weekly pay checks a year nor are 
companies now being called upon to provide complete coverage 
by themselves. I 
The evolution of the demands for absolute guarantees to an I 
integration of private contributions with state unemployment 
compensation funds covers a period of approximately 60 years. 
A study made in 1947 by Joseph L. Snider, professor of 
business economics at the Harvard Graduate School of Business 
Administration, gives this definition of guaranteed annual 
wages, n .... e.ither an announced policy of an employer or an 
agreement by an employer with a labor union, providing for a 
stipulated amount of work or wages during the year, to a 
l 
stipulated portion of the workers. 11 
This definition is broad enough to cover the early 
guarantee plans and still leaves room for the most recent plans 
providing for supplementation of unemployment compensation 
benefits (SUB). A look at the plans which have been formulated 
since 1894 will indicate the wide latitude given by the 
definition. 
8 
It will be noted that Professor Snider brings into f'ocus 
the distinction between guarantees 0f work and of' wages. There 
has been no one pattern followed by all companies when they 
have approached the issue of' guarantees. It can almost be said 
that there are as many plans as there are companies guarantee-
ing work or wages. Some companies have found it feasible to 
promise to provide some kind of' work for a portion of' their 
workers, while others have had to rely on setting up a fund to 
take care of' employees when no work is to be had. 
The use of' the term 11 public relationsn will refer to any 
dealings of' an organization with one or more of' its publics 
for the purposes of' achieving understanding of' its position on 
the guaranteed annual wage or any other related aspect--job 
security, work stabilization, steady work and pay. 
For the purposes of' this study, all programs carried on 
in the name of' 11 employee relations, 11 or 11 industrial relations 11 
will be considered as part of' an over-all public relations 
approach. 
Job Security 
The quest for security in American life today is high-
lighted by an incident cited in management circles. The young 
college graduate, being interviewed by a large company, asked 
one question: Does this company have a pension plan? 
This apparent lack of a risk-taking attitude on the part of 
young people is only a part of the over-all search for security 
being carried on by the worker in industries subject to 
cyclical and seasonal instability. 
The move by unions for pension plans, hospitalization, 
accident insurance, and other methods of cushioning the worker 
against the effects of job stoppage or loss now results in a 
move to secure the job itself. S. Herbert Unterberger comments· 
••• in the last decade the employee has been looking 
increasingly to his job to help him cope with these 
hazards (the hazards of life) not only by reason of 
the wages paid him but also by reason of the benefits 
provided. The wages earned support him and.his family. 
But in recent years many jobs also provide a measure of 
protection to the employee and his family against the 
hazards of illness, disability, and death, regardless of 
whether they are connected with his employment or not. 
In the light of this background, the employee encounters 
no logical difficulty in demanding that the next step be 
taken; namely, that his job should also protect him 
against the hazard of losing that very job.2 
A union official sets the necessity for be~ring the risk 
against these hazards squarely on the shoulders of those who 
manage. Said Solomon Barkin, director of research, Textile 
Workers Union (CIO): 
The risk takers are the property owners. They should, 
in our society, bear these particular costs (of fail-
ures). They cannot justly escape these costs as they 
have done. The social cost of business must become 
a substantial part of the accounting of enterprise .••. 
The responsibility for technical development rests 
primarily with management. Organized labor will 
gladly share to the extent that management allows 
it to participate and thereby increase management's 
effectiveness.3 
,, 
!i 
I' ;j 
i: 
II 
IL,f ~ story J11 rn.J- _ of Early Guarantee Plans 
II 
I Historically, the prevailing viewpoint regarding unemploy- I 
I ~ 
1
ment was that it was a personal, rather than a social problem. I/ 
liThe setting up of the first state unemployment office in 1890 in~~ 
!'Ohio was the beginning of the realization that the community ~~ 
!must bear some of the responsibility for those out of work 
I 
through no fault of their own.4 J 
Soon after the start of the state unemployment offices 
ian attempt was made in the wall paper industry to guarantee 
!work. In negotiations between the National Wall Paper Company 
I! 
I 
1 and the National Association of Machine Printers and Color i I Mixers , ll months o:f emplo-sment were guaranteed. When~ in 1896 , II 
I a 12-month guarantee was agreed upon, other companies in the II 
I industry followed suit. !1 
I 
ji 
. Approximately 34 plans were established by 1930. These II 
I included several more pre-1890 plans, one between 1900 and 1910,/1 
'\seven between 1910 and 1920, and at least 26 plans set up I 
during the 1920's. 
5 
Unemployment Compensation law, passed in 1932. It provided for 
1 a complete exemption from an unemployment compensation tax for 
I. employers that guaranteed their employees at least 42 ~6-hour 
!I 
11 weeks of employment a year. The provision was changed in 1935 
II 
i 
lito 
II 
!lit 
40 weeks at two-thirds of full-time pay. 
When the federal Social Security Act was passed in 1935, 
allowed only reduced contribution rates to employers 
11 
guaranteeing work, not complete exemption. The Wisconsin law 
11was revised to conform with the federal act' and all of the 
96 employers that had instituted guarantee plans discontinued 
I 6 
!them. 
! 
I 
roverrnnent Inducements for Guarantees 
i Under the current state unemployment compensation systems 
I 
! a reduction in contributions is allowed based on the employer r s 
r 
1
·1
1
past employment record. Called experience or merit rating, I 
1
1 this provision has been under criticism from some quarters on II 
I' 
!the grounds that it is being misused. It has been said that lj 
11 the desire to keep the tal< low has resulted in an attempt to ~~~ 
1 disqualify as many workers as possible from receiving unemploy-
1 
I 
ment compensation benefits. 
The government provided another inducement for guarantee 
I 
!plans in 1938 with the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
I Under Section 7 (b) ( 2) of the Act an employer can secure 
I 
Jexemption from time and one-half penalty rates for all overtime 
II up to 12 hours in one day and 56 in one week if he grants an 
I
I . 
!annual guarantee of employment (between 1,840 and 2,080 hours) 
II 
I 
,, 
II 
I' 
!!through a collective bargaining agreement made with a bona fide 
J1 union, certified by the National Labor Relations Board. If the 1 
=====rr=' =em=p=l=o=y=e=e=s=a=r=e=r=e=q=u=i=r=e=d=t=o=w=o=r=k==o=v=e=r=2=,=0=8=0=h=o=ur=s=d=ur=i=ng==a=n=y===dlL 
I 
I' 
II ,, 
II 
l! 
)1 
. I 
II 
II 
I !52 consecutive weeks, all hours over 40 in any week become 
!subject to overtime payment. 
I 
j The Act also gives the right to deduct, f'or incorp.e tax 
12 
1lpurposes, all expenses connected with a plan if' it was demanded 
I 
!by the employees and negotiated through collective bargaining. 
I 
II 
, . 
11 According to the Bureau o:f National Af'f'airs, less than 
lltwo dozen plans or this type were on rile with the Wage and Hour
1 
iDivision of' the U. S. Department o:f Labor as of' March, 1955. 1
1 
1
steelworkers' Demands 
i 
I 
l 
II due 
During World War II guarantee plans lost their expediency 
to high employment in the country, but as the war, came to 
i 
'an I jthe 
end the United Steelworkers of' America presented a demand to 
steel industry f'or a minimum weekly wage o:f 40 hours pay 
I 
f'or duration.of' the contract (a two-year contract was being 
sought). The steelworkers asked that: 
II 
1. every employee be covered by a wage guarantee; 
2. all costs be met by the employer; 
3. workers get a minimum weekly wage of' 40 times the 
straight-time hourly rate. For employees employed 
on the ef'f'ective date o:f the contract the rate was 
to be based on the straight-time hourly rate :for 
the preceding year, or that portion,during which 
he was employed by the company, plus any wage 
adjustment; .for employees subsequently employed, 
the straight-time hourly rate was to be that ,of' 
I 
I 
I 
I 
r 
II 
I 
,/ 
I! II 
II 
I 
II 
l 
I 
J 
'I 
I 
• 
il 
II 
"This was virtually a demand for a 100 per c7nt guarantee il 
I 
of wages without any significant qualifications. 11 II 
The National War Labor Board rejected this demand on the I I 
!basis o:f a lack o:f information on how such a plan would work. ~~ 
It recommended, though, a study on a national scale to determineil 
I! 
the first three months of employment. 
1 the feasibility of such plans. President Roosevelt endorsed 1 
,, the study and appointed Murray Latimer, research director of I 
I I the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, to head the I 
lproject. II 
The study, two years in the making, produced the following II 
I 
I conclusions: 
1
:1 1. Adoption of guaranteed wage plans should not pe the 
!subject of legislative action, but should be referred to free 
I II 
II I \collective bargaining; I, 
lj I 2. Guaranteed annual wage plans, if w~dely adopted, if 
jsafeguarded against excessive cost, and if adequately financed, 
lwould be beneficial to the economy; 
3. Such plans should be integrated with the state unemploy-1 I 
ment compensation laws. I 
II 'CIO unions continued their demands :for the GAW. The Unite, 
1
Auto Workers brought up a plan for negotiation with the.Ford J 
!Motor Company in 1947 and the United Steelworkers asked for a J 
guarantee in 1951 when bargaining with the basic steel industry.~~ 
1
1 
The steel negotiations became deadlocked and went before the 1 
~~Wage Stabilization Board in 1952. Although Latimer himself ,, 
I 
I 
li 
II 
I! 
I! 
l4l 
made the union presentation, the WSB re:t'used .. to honor the 
!
union's demands. 
I Again in 1954 the Steelworkers came up with a guaranteed 
!wage demand which was not pressed seriously. By this time~ the 
I 
!UAW-CIO had 
.lwas engaged 
llin 195.5. 
already set up a committee to study the problem and 
in an educational campaign that was to bear :fruit 
I Before examining the conditions which produced what the I 
National Association of' Manufacturers called the rt capitulatiod' I 
i ll of the Ford Motor Company to the guaranteed annual wage I 
!!principle~ it would be wise to look at what are known as the 1 
II "traditional" guarantee plans in industry. They are signif'icant I 
l because theyare examples of' succes,s:t'ul plans~ operating more 
than 20 years each4 They are also lffiportant because the UAW and 
I I USA chose to ignore the bases upon which these plans are built 
when they went :for guarantees in their own industries. 
!The Procter & Gamble Plan 
Cincinnati, Ohio, does not guarantee wages. It does guarantee I· 
Ito all hourly paid employees who have been with the company :fori i. 
1!24 consecutive months or more employment for 48 standard work 
1lweeks a year. The present length of the· standard work week, 
I 
!determined by the company, is 40 hours. The Plan covers 80 to 
·90 per cent of' all hourly paid workers at Procter & Gamble. 
,, 
I 
I 
II 1920 r s 
1
\ I! In the early when the plan was being formulated, it I 
~~as deemed necessary to stabilize the operations of the company I 
I II 
(before any plan could be feasible. A major reorganization of II 
I 11 !jthe company's manufacturing and marketing methods was undertakenjj 
1
1 · I Ito e:f:t'ectuate an even flow o:f production and sales. It was 
1
1 
!necessary to re-educate wholesalers who were in the habit o:f I 
i~uying in large and uneven quantities and storing inventories 
~efore selling to retailers. 
I 
I The amount of production is based on forecasting how much jl 
lsoap and shortening, the company's principal products, will be 
!sold in one year. The yearly estimate, made by the sales and 
!advertising departments, is reviewed every three months, but 
!careful scheduling has resulted in a usual variation of only 
/11 to 2 per cent of the yearly estimates. The company's shift 
II 
lin product line after 1945 to synthetic detergents was accom- !I 
1
1plished without any modifications in the Plan. I 
i The company, which inaugurated its Plan unilaterally and II 
1lcontinues it on this basis although there are unions represented!! 
llin its plants, built in a number o:f sa:feguards. It reserves II 
lithe right to transfer employees to other jobs i:f operations makelj 
!!this necessary. The board of directors may also reduce the l 
jguarantee to a minlillum of 75 per cent of the normal work week. l 
I Ib has been necessary to reduce the guarantee only once 
!lin the Plan's 30-year history. In the depression year of 1932 
lithe work week was reduced in three plants. Even in these plants I ~~however, the total guarantee o:f 48 :full weeks o:f emplo-yment :for ~ 
II 
II 
,. 
il 
II 
lithe entire year was maintained. The board of directors also 
!reserves the right to modify, withdraw or terminate the Plan 
1
1
at any time without notice. 
II II q 
,, 
16 j 
,, 
II 
!I 
I 
I Procter & Gamble considers its Guaranteed Employment Plan I I 
an important factor in maintaining its record of more than 
8 
65 years without a major labor difficulty. ji 
The Procter & Gamble plan is an example, as noted earlier, j 
1
of Approach No. 5, wherein a company sets up the plan and has 
!!complete control of its operation. Workers in this company do 
jnot seem to resent -this aspect of the guarantee. On this score 
1
1Professor Snider commented: 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Although many other things are negotiated the workers 
appear content to receive the guarantee as an additional 
benefit generously provided by the management. This 
policy on the part of the management may continue to 
work satisfactorily at the Procter & Gamble Company 
for an indefinite period even though the writer is 
II 
of the opinion that ordinarily wage and employment 
guarantees should be a matter of discussion and 
negotiation between management and workers. But I 
there is no reason to change the situation at Procter 
& Gamble so long as conditions remain as satisfactory 
as they are. 11 9 
I 
liThe Hormel Plan 
!I 
I I The meatpacking business of which the Hormel Company of 
!Austin, Minnesota is a part, is subject to seasonal or short-
1 
term fluctuations but enjoys long-term stability. Hormel 1 s 
wage plan, which evolved gradually from 1927 to 1940, consists 
of an annual basic wage, a group incentive bonus, and a share 
ilin the profits. It is incorporated in a collective bargaining 
li 
I 
v' 
,, 
II 
!I 17 I 
II 
lfberminated by either party on 90 days notice prior to a speci- jl, 
il 
l!:fied annual date. There is no period of service required. All IJ 
except part-time workers are covered. 1 
The company pays a worker in each of 52 weeks in a year 
an,amount equal to at least 38 times his hourly rate whether he 
II 
1
1
works less or more than 38 hours. In addition there are extra 
,~ayments for such things as changing clothes and an allowance 
~~or clothing. The basic pay plus these extras make up the 
I 
I 
I 
I 
t::::d w::::y t:::e ~n ::e::g:h:f e;: ~:~:e a y:::k:m::;e::c:::: a 1! 
!check for the extra hours. Employees may receive, in addition !I 
llo their guarantee, the equivalent in pay of the number of hours 
1 
1
khey save in performing the work scheduled. 
A profit-sharing arrangement pays off in proporti.on to base II 
.j 
ltrates. Although it is unilateral, a contract provision permits II I II 
!!renegotiation o:f sections of the agreement i:f the company should IJ 
~~exercise its option to terminate the plan on 90 days' notice. li 
lj Hormel 1 s plan is one of the few registered with the Wage jl I II ~~and Hour Division of the U. s. Department of Labor under the !! 
Jrair Labor Standards Act, and therefore the company is able to J 
!!save on overtime paJilUents. It also pays an unemploJilUent compen-1 
lsation tax rate lower by about 2 per cent of payroll than its 1 
tpre-guarantee emplo-yment experience would rate. ~~ 
11 I j' From a communications point of view it is interesting to I _________j~t when the plan was :first introduced workers did not II 
==~·~ I 
t 
I! /: ,, 
i! 
II 
l8 \i 
'I 
respond very well. 
Management then believed it was giving them (employees) 
I an opportunity for an expression of opinion, but found 
/j· the workers did not offer their real objections until 
they had organized and had a recognized spokesman. 
I! Details of establishing production standards were 
1,. successfully accomplished when the employees had the 
I opportunity to cooperate. Production standards were !
1 
set up in terminology familiar to the men, after it 
11 had been found that the men misunderstood the words 
1 chosen by management and resisted introduction of the I plan.lO 
~~ Once the plan was established it has worked very well. 
'[reason advanced by Snider is: 
II One condition which has made the Rormel plan work and which does not exist in many other companies is the 
1
: close relationship between the management on the one 
.
1 
side and the workers on the other ••. The fact that 
' management and ownership are closely identified in 
the Harmel Company is a further reason why the interest 
1 in steadiness of employment and opportunity to take 
I action are so pronounced. This is another aspect which differentiates the situation in Austin, from 
1 that in the large meat-packing companies in Chicago. 
j When a company is actively managed by the owners and 
located in a small community, there is much greater 
incentive for adoption of stabilization and guarantee 
measures, partly because of more effective pressure 
from the community to bring about such measures.ll 
A 
, This same condition, a large company in a small town, can 
II also react to the detriment of guarantees, as we shall see in 
lj the subsequent discussion of the situation in Newton, Iowa 
!1 and the Maytag Company. 
liThe Nunn-Bush Plan 
-I[ I The Nunn-Bush Shoe Company of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, put 
Jinto effect in 1935, a plan known as "Fifty-Two Pay Checks a 
, Year. 11 Part of the collective bargaining agreements with the I 
ll 
'I 
,, 
! 
I 
I 
II 
I! 
!I 
I 
I 
'I I• 
Ii
i I 
I 
_jl 191 
!
'!Industrial Union of' Master Craf'tsmen (Independent), it is now ll 
,I called the "Share the Production Plan. 11 I\ 
• I Under this plan the workers are paid a specif'ied proportion~~~ 
lof the value of the shoes produced by the company. They are 
ljpaid regular weekly checks regardless of the hours or days when 
the factory is shut down and adjustments are made every four 
I 
I 
1
Jweeks depending on the volume of production. 
I The plan is subject to joint management-union administra-
tion. The union has two members on the corporate board of I 
'I I directors. Company and union officials must agree on production!! 
1~ 'I 
1
, standards before they can become effective and these standards 
•iare enf'orced primarily by the union of'f'icials. 
j Individual drawing accounts are set up for eligible 
Jworkers. Each worker draws one fifty-second of his 11 yearly 
differential rate" in any given week .. At the end of every four I 
I' 
., 
i 
" 
,, 
The Nunn-Bush Company enjoys exceptionally good relations 
I 
I 
II 
. [I 
,I 
·J I 
It is evident that these plans have been successful because 11 
jthey are adapted to the peculiar circumstances in their own I 
_jl 20 ll 
I 1
1
1 !industries. In all cases the companies made efforts to stabil-
lize their operations before initiating any kind of guarantee. I 
~~Although the Harmel and Nunn-Bush plans are part o:f collective I 
I· I 
rjbargaining agreements, it was the move on the part of management !1 
1, I 
Ito establish and maintain the plans which has insured their j, 
!success. jl 
1 As Neil McElroy, president of Procter &: Gamble, said in a 11 
I 
II 
II 
I' 
,, 
II q 
I 
speech before the National Industrial Conference Board: 
Every part of our business believed in the guarantee 
of employment and made the adjustments in its oper-
ations that were necessary to carry it through. As 
we look back now over the 30 years during whlch the 
plan has been operating, we believe in it more strong-
ly than ever--not alone because of the assurance it 
provides to our factory employees, but also because, 
through the avoidance of peaks and valleys of production 
which is implicit in this plan, we have been able to 
make maximum use of our manufacturing facilities, with 
all that that means in terms of avoidance of excessive 
capital investment, and in the lowering of cost of 
manufacture .12 
ITre~d Toward Supplementary Unemployment Compensation Benefits 
There was no question in any of the foregoing plans of 
supplementing unemployment compensation pay because the accent 
lwas on providing work where at all possible. Each of these 
!/plans had been operating successfully long before the issuance 
11 of the Latimer Report, the first serious proposal that there be 
/integration of private and public funds. 
I L___ The Steelworkers were the first to pick up the recommenda-
==!~ 
I 
li 
II 
II 
I 
I. 
IJ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
tj 
II 
I 
II 
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li 
li 
II II j! 
II r j/ tion for supplementation of' unemployment compensation benef'i ts 
jbut the UAW-CIO deserves the credit for being the first union to\l 
I I' 
f study seriously the whole area of' guaranteed wages to determine 1! 
I II iwhat was actually feasible in its industry. 
,I 
I The special study committee of the UAW made a point of 
11 studying all the objections which had been raised in the past 
~'1. and of producing a program which would be hard for the industry 
lito turn down. The principle that the UAW operated on was that 
/the laid-off' worker should have more purchasing power; and it 
!should be expensive for employers to lay off' workers. 
As early as 1952 the union approached the major companies 
lin the automobile industry to inform them that it would press 
rseriously for this demand at the next negotiations--scheduled 
l
lf'or .June, 1955. Also in 1952, the Ford Motor Company began to 
study its layoff' history and investigate the cost of a 
I 
I! guarantee. 
II l. It 
Three conditions were paramount in their view: 
would be necessary to limit the iiability 
II of the company; 
li li 2. The cost would have to be predictable; 
3. The plan should be tied in with state unemployment 
compensation systems. 
II ,. 
II I 
I 
I 
i 
li 
II 
'I 
I 
i 
l 
I 
I 
II 
. The pattern of negotiations in the automobile industry ' 
!followed this general outline. The General Motors contract I 
!expired first (May 29, 1955), but the UAW extended that contract! 
Ito be able to bargain first with Ford. In the pre-GM negotiat- Jl 
I I ling period, the union saw a copy of the stock-option pacKage 
I 
! 
.I 
~ I I 22 I ======~===============================================~!:====== l r ll 11 which General Motors was planning to oi'i'er the workers. li ;'·.·I j In the Ford negotiations, with a strike threatened unless 
a II the companv acquiesced to the union Guaranteed Employment Plan. 1,! 
.. J J II 
Ford produced a package with a stock-option oi'i'er similar to II 
1
that presented by GM. The UAW turned it down on the grounds II 
!that it would be meaningless to a large proportion oi' the work- I 
lers, who, they contended, couldn't ai'i'ord to buy stock anyway. 1 
1/The union was so certain o:f its unacceptability to the member- :I 
iship that it oi'i'ered to submit the plan to the workers and li 
accept their verdict. The alternative, o:f course, was a strike . !I 
I The company then came up with its own SUB plan which had I! 
jbeen worked out by its i'inance and industrial relations depart- II 
! 'I' lments as a result oi' the study started in l952. 
1
j 
I 
Ford Plan Provisions 
Instead o:r a pay-as-you-go plan, which the union wanted, 
I the company provided for a trust fund to be set up, to which it 11 
1
1 I! Jlwould contribute :five cents per worker :for each hour worked. Jl 
/fActually two :funds would be set up--one :ror regular employees II 
I
. and one :for dei'ense workers. 1j 
'I 
I The plan provided that a laid-oi'i' worker would get 65 1 
I l!per cent o:r his a:rter-ta:x pay i'or the i'irst :four weeks o:r 
II lay o:f:f, and 6 0 per cent :for an additional 22 weeks, giving him 
1i a total o:r 26 weeks o:r potential· benei'i ts. However, he could 
II 
!I 
II 
.I 
not draw more than $25 a week and his actual SUB benei'it would 
the dii'ference between unemployment compensation plus any 
I! 
" 'I 
I 
I 
I 23 \ 
I 
I 
~~ other compensation and 65 or 60 per cent o:f his a:fter-tax pay. 
II Eligibility requirements were set up 
i 
II 
II 
!I 
!j 
II 
II 
as follows: 
l. The worker must be eligible for a state u.c. benefit; 
2. He must have at least one year's seniority; 
3. He must have had a nwai ting week. 11 I 11 
The plan is based on a system o:f credit units which the j1 I 
I worker builds up as he works. 'These units are :for:fei ted week b 11 il 
!week as he draws bene:fits. The number of credit units which he II 
ilmust surrender is determined by the size o:f the :fund at the tirneli 
I o:f the lay o:f:f, and on his seniority. I 
I The operation o:f the plan was made contingent upon rulings 
I by the :federal government that expenses :for the plan would be 
I deductible :for income tax purposes; and that contributions II 
IJwould be excluded in computations under the Fair Labor Standards!] 
l1 Act. These rulings have been secured. 
I It was also agreed that before benefit payments could 
II start, rulings on the possibility o:f integration o:f private I 
'[:funds with state :funds must be obtained in states in which the I! 
i company has two-thirds of its hourly working :force. Most states! 
I have given their approval at this writing. II 
I The agreement at Ford :for a plan o:f this type made it jl 
1! di:f:ficul t for General Motors to turn down a GAW request by the II 
II union. The plan agreed to a week later at GM is substantially II 
II the same as Ford 1 s • In subsequent talks with the major can II 
I cOIIlpanies, the U~ited Steelworkers also negotiated SUB plans. II 
\\The UAWt s prediction that 1955 would be the year for a GAW was, \
1 
in the main, substantiated. 
Trends in Other Industries 
In the flat-glass industry, the United Glass and Cerfu~ic 
Workers of America (CIO} had negotiated contracts with 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company and Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass " II 
11 
Company in May, 1955. The GAW provision of their contracts was 11 
left pending study. In September, 1955, after the SUB principle,! 
was established in the automobile industry, plans were set up 
in the glass companies as well. 
These plans are essentially different from other SUB 
provisions. Instead of a pooled fund they feature individual 
savings plans for each employee, and the worker thus has a 
vested interest in his own account. Employees do not have to 
I 
I 
wait to be laid off to collect benefits, but may do so at their' 
own discretion in case of illness or disability. Benefits are 
not integrated with unemployment compensation. 
Vested rights plans have also been negotiated with the 
Euclid Division of General Motors in Cleveland (Road Machinery 
Workers-Ind.) and the Automotive Tool and Die Manufacturers 
Association of Detroit (UAW-CIO). 
Wbile the UAW and USA were achieving what they called 
1
'victories11 in the area of the guaranteed annual wage, ;their 
fellow CIO union, the International Union of Electrical, Radio I 
and Machine Workers, suffered a setback at the hands of General II 
Electric Company. When the GE contract came up for negotiation L __ _ 
T 
• 
-
J''
1
1
·. II 25!! 
_j! 
I in August, 19.55 the company refused to consider any :form o:f GAW II 
II I; and instead offered the union a well thought-out pension and 
ij insurance plan which contained sufficient benefits to force the 
lj union to accept it. I 
i il j General Electric signed a five-year contract with the IUE. 'I 
II The only concession on the GAW issue is a reopener clause which Ji 
allows for further talks on guarantees in l958 if either side II 
notifies the other within sixty days of October l. The union J I 
I I has the right to strike at that time if agreement cannot be 
I reached. I . 
I. 
II Attitudes of Employees 
I 
II 
J 
I' II 
II 
I 
tl 
carried /1 
,: 
The fight over the guaranteed annual wage has been 
II 
II the workers. 
on largely by top management and union officials. Only 
occasionally has the issue been brought down to the level of 
That the workers themselves do not always under-
stand the issues involved has been brought out by several 
I' 
I 
,,·I I! 
\i I' 
I
' sources. 11 
II A. D. H. Kaplan quotes a survey taken by Factory Managemen~ 
! and Maintenance magazine in l94.5 in which less than 40 per cent ji 
i 
i 
jl heard of 
j w·orkers t 
I Board.l.3 
annual wage case was presented to the War Labor 
!Jl While 
\I may 
,, 
I 
,j 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
,I 
is somewhat hard to understand. Yet Hugh Rusch, vice 
- I 
president 1 
of the Opinion Research Corporation, reported at a meeting of 
the National Association of Manufacturers in June, 1955 that: 
It takes a terrific amount of communications effort 
to get ideas into the minds of people in this 
country. This awareness of the guaranteed annual 
wage issue has gone up considerably since a year 
ago, but not anywhere near to the point where the 
labor leaders would have you think it has. For 
example, about a year ago 23 per cent of the 
general public said that they heard or read about 
guaranteed wage plans. It 1 s now gone up to 38 
per cent. F\u~ther among members of the CJO, it 1 s 
gone up from 36 per cent to 56 per cent.l4 
i 
I 
In view of the UAW 1 s educational drive on the GAW which II 
had been going on for more than three years at the time of this 11 
NAM meeting, Mr. Rusch's following statement contains particula11i 
- I 
interest: ' 
When we ask workers who say they were told about the 
GAW where they heard about it, they reply as follows: 
27 per cent say that they heard about it in newspapers; 
27 per cent from union sources; 23 per cent from fellow 
employees; 7 per cent from radio and TV; about5 16 per cent don 1 t know just where they did hear it .1 ·· 
I 
lj 
1
/ did not mention having heard about the issue from their 
For purposes of this study it is significant that workers 
I 
l 
II ,, 
I 
I 
I companies. 
! 
I, 
1 
2 
FOOTNOTES 
Snider, Joseph L., The Guarantee o~ Work and ~ages, 
Boston: Division o~ Research, Graduate School o~ Business 
Administration, Harvard University, 1947, p. 1 
Unterberger, S. Herbert, Guaranteed Wage and Supplementary 
~Plans, Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 
1956, p. 7 
3 
Barkin, Solomon, "The Challenge o~ Annual Wages, 11 Personnel 
Journal, April, 1946, p. 369 
4 
Garbarino, J. W., Guaranteed Wages, Berkeley, Cali~ornia: 
.5 
Institute o~ Industrial Relations, University of Cali~ornia, 
19.54, p. 1.5 
Bureau o~ National A~~airs, Inc., The Guaranteed Annual Wage, 
Washington, D. C., 19.5.5,p. 2 
6 
Ibid. 
7 
Ibid. 
8 
Procter & Gamble Company, Fact Sheet on Procter & Gamblers 
Guaranteed Emplo~ent Plan 
9 
Snider, .2.E cit., p. 17 
10 
Ibid., p. 23-24 
11 
Ibid.,p. 28 
12 
Procter & Gamble Company, _2.E cit., p. 3 
13 
Kaplan, A.D.H., The Guarantee of Annual Wages, Washington: 
The Brookings Institution, 1~7, p. 23 
14 
National Association of Manufactuners, Proceediqgs of 
Management Conference on the Guaranteed Annual Wage, 
Chicago, June 15, 19S~p. 7 
15 
Ibid. 
CHAPTER III 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT ATTITUDES ON THE GUARANTEED ANNUAL WAGE 
A cursory analysis of the literature on the guaranteed 
annual wage issue might lead one to believe that no one is 
interested in it. Traditionally, the 11 management point o:f view11 
has been one o:f dislike--ranging :from discreet refusal to dis-
cuss the issue to out-and-out opposition to it. The over-all 
management view has been that :for industries where employees 
11 needn a guarantee because of the real danger o:f layoffs, this 
kind o:f security is not feasible for companies to grant. In 
industries where stability has already been achieved, a 
guarantee would be meaningless. 
Supporting this viewpoint is a survey among industrial :firms 
quoted in the July, 1953 issue o:f Mill and Factory magazine. Of 
the 230 respondents, 97 per cent felt that a guaranteed annual 
wage was impractical as :far as industry in general was concerned. 
I And, as recently as April, 1956, a survey of 51 United 
States labor leaders by the National Industrial Conference 
Board indicated that the supplementary unemployment benefit 
plans negotiated in 1955 had failed to captivate the minds of 
most labor leaders. 
I:f industry isn't interested, i:f most labor leaders don•t 
like it, if as shown earlier, many workers haven't even heard of 
it--why, then all the current hulabaloo over the GAW issue? 
Obviously, the answer lies in the fact that semantics plays 
a J__gg_e part iq._@y_§~y conducted on_:the issue. While 
30 
managements in general do not want to become involved in a 
guarantee o~ wages ~or no work, they are very seriously inter-
ested in work stabilization. Their ~eelings are expressed in 
terms o~ guarding their traditional prerogatives o~ managing, 
and in stressing their awareness o~ the ~act that, a~ter all, 
stabilization is nothing more than good business • 
. 
Unions which are not enchanted by SUB are nevertheless 
concerned with seeking ways o~ guarding their membership ~rom 
hardships incurred by layo~~s. The alternatives to SUB which 
they endorse are liberalized state unemployment compensation, 
severance pay plans, and a shorter work week. 
The pattern ~or SUB plans set by the Auto Workers in 1955 
and by the basic steel industry in 1956 may go no ~urther. On 
the other hand, as the unions which have negotiated plans press 
~or more liberalized benefits, other unions may get on the 
bandwagon. They may have no choice. 
An example is the International Association o~ Machinists 
(AFL). Soon a~ter the Ford contract was signed, the IAM had 
this to say! 
The UAW-CIO undoubtedly had good and sufficient reason 
~or accepting the Ford Plan. But, every I. A. M. repre-
sentative ought to think twice before profosing or 
accepting the Ford Plan or similar plans. 
Yet when the American Can Company signed its SUB agreement 
with the United Steelworkers and a majority of the companyts 
. 
employees became eligible for bene~its, the IAM was ~orced to 
accept the same plan ~or its workers in the company. 
Unions associated with the AFL have historically been 
reluctant to press the issue or guaranteed wages. This is 
;~ particularly true of the older craft unions where maintenance 
of craft standards and high pay rates have long been more 
important to members than over-all security guarantees. 
31 
Management•s complaint that the principle of _GAW cannot be 
accepted without an overhaul of our basic economic system has 
been echoed in labor ranks. It is hard to tell which of the 
following statements was made by whom: 
••• it is conceivable that the compulsory guaranteed 
wage might be made to work to some extent. But it 
would be made so, not be adapting it to our existing 
economy, but by adapting our existing economy to it, 
with the practical certainty of a radically different 
economic order being the eventual outcome.2 
The whole program presages the junking of the American 
way of life and the forfeiture of our industrial 
liberties in return for a promised security which 
cannot be guaranteed--a bureaucratic rule over our 
whole scheme of life.3 
•.• guaranteed annual wage plans cannot be established 
on a nationwide basis without establish~ng a planned 
economy in America.4 
These three statements, the first from the (then) chairman 
of the board of the U. S. Steel Corporation and the last two 
from union publications show a distrust of the workability of 
GAW plans. 
In spite of acceptance on the part of the major automobile 
producers and other large companies that the SUB principle is 
workable, union people today (eleven years after the statements 
quoted above were made) still voice objections. Their reasons 
are different, but they are still significant. 
Personally, I am not very enthusiastic about any of the 
so-called supplementary unemployment benefit programs. 
All workers regardless of industry or labor contract, 
should be the beneficiaries of adequate unemployment 
benefits. These benefits should come to them as a 
result of legislation enacted by the various state 
legislatures, in order that all workers within the 
states will be the beneficiaries of unemployment 
compensation.5 
And again, 
Frankly, I haven't had very much time to make a study 
of supplementary-unemployment benefits. Business has 
been so good in the industry for the past ten or twelve 
years that we have been able to negotiate wage increases 
year after year and I have every reason to think we shall 
be able to negotiate another round this year.6 
It may well be that as payments under SUB become necessary 
as a result of layoffs in the automobile industry (model change-
overs are scheduled for August and September 1956) that the 
difficulties in administering a plan will become more evident 
and act as a further incentive for unions to seek benefits 
other than SUB. 
Management's Point of View 
The National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber 
of Commerce of the United States have been the major voices 
raised in management's behalf against the GAW. 
The NAM campaign has been going on for several years and 
according to one union official7 its all-out publicity effort 
against Jtpay for no work11 was the reason for the change in name 
by the UAW from "Guaranteed Annual Wage u to "Guaranteed Employ-
33 
ment Plan. 11 
The NAM attack on GAW took the form of a drive for work 
stabilization to eliminate the need for guarantees. As early 
as 1946 the NAM started its nsteadyWork and Steady Payn 
program and held more than 5oo clinics throughout the country 
to educate employers on the subject. 
In the foreword of its pamphlet entitled Toward Steadier 
Work and Pay Henry G. Ritter, III, then president of NAM, said: 
The union drive for a guaranteed annual wage with its 
implied promise of ttsecurity11 tends to undermine under-
standing of the basic conditions which are essential to 
real job and income continuity. There can be no real 
security without production. nPlansn which purport to 
deliver security on any other basis fail to take account 
of the economic facts of life and the effective operation 
of our free competitive risk economy. Maximum production--
the only sound basis for real security--requires that the 
business system itself be healthy and dynamic and 
nguaranteesu do not contribute to that end. 
Soon after the Ford and GM contracts were signed in June, 
1955 the NAM conducted a series of management conferences on 
the GAW. A major meeting was held in June in Chicago in 
cooperation with the Illinois Manufacturers Association. A few 
weeks later another group met in New York. The keynote speaker 
at the 
I 
Chicago meeting was Dr. Robert E. Wilson, chairman of thel 
I 
board, Standard Oil Company (Indiana). He summed up management'~ 
traditional arguments against the GAW thus: 
We may well ask, what price security, in the form of a 
guaranteed annual wage? Security for some at the expense 
of the joblessness of others? Security for some at the 
cost of higher prices for the 160 million consumers who 
would inevitably finance such a plan? Security for some 
at the price of slowing up the rapid -economic progress 
we have had under our present system? 
I 
And surely anything approaching a real guarantee of 
annual wages~ bringing with it rigid, fixed costs, heavy 
and uncertain future liabilities~ increased labor costs, 
and hence, higher prices, would effectively weaken 
industry 1 s ability to provide more and better jobs.8 
An interesting note is that Dr. Wilson's company is not one 
of those which has been faced with the GAW. 
In addition to the argument of high, fixed costs which the 
GAW would bring, employers have listed other reasons why they 
are against it. 
They feel that a guarantee would work against high producti-
vity by the worker. Given a chance to collect as much as 
two-thirds of his normal pay without working, a man may well be 
tempted to sit out a layoff, rather than seeking out a new job. 
~s pointed out in a recent study9 a person's feeling on this 
~atter would be based on his philosophy of human nature and 
~uman behavior. If one believes that economic want motivates a 
~an to work and that with enough to live on he would just as 
soon 11 go fishin11 one would have serious doubts about what would 
happen to productivity if guarantees were introduced on a large 
scale. If one believes that men essentially want to work and 
that secure workers produce the most, one will not see anything 
insidious in a guaranteed wage. 
Another argument of employers is that any form of a guaran-
tee will divide the workers into two groups--those who are 
covered and those who are not. They say that high seniority 
workers who are rarely, if ever, faced with layoffs would be 
3.5 
contributing what otherwise would have been a wage increase for 
them to ease the burden of those who are laid off. The possi-
bility has even been raised that high seniority workers might 
ask that they be laid off to receive a "vacation with pay. n 
The proposition by unions that the plans be administered 
by joint union-management boards raises another problem for 
employers. They foresee a loss of management prerogatives for 
such things as pricing and decisions to expand which would have 
a bearing on the question of lay offs and therefore on any plan 
in effect. 
A safety provision introduced by unions to cover the plans--
a reinsurance pool covered either by a private insurance company 
or by the government--raises the fear in management circles of 
ultimate government contro~ of their industries. 
And, not the least of management worries, is the fact that 
while the initial plans suggested by unions may sound quite 
feasible and relatively painless, there is always the move for 
liberalized benefits once a plan gets started. The classic 
exrunple which employers point to in this regard is the welfare 
fund set up for the United Mine Workers which began with an 
insignificant .5 cents per ton royalty contribution by soft coal 
operators and which over the years has risen to 40 cents a ton. 
The union contention that supplementary unemployment benefit 
plans will force employers to support liberalized state 
unemployment compensation is also not calculated to please. 
Employers point out that they are already paying for unemploy-
. I I 
===11==========~====9361[ __ i 
I 
1 
ment compensation through their state systems and that liberal-r-1 
Management people in the main have been less opposed to 
interests plans as negotiated in the flat glass 
While one union 'I I 
.!I 
'I 11brings to mind the rugged individualism that we sometimes hear I 
preached, 11 the NAM believes that this is the very reason why 
j'they should be employed if there is to be any plan at all. 
The State Group Advisory Committee on Unemployment Compensa-1 
1
1 tion of the National Industrial Council made the following 11 
,, 
I suggestions: II 
I ! Any employer wishing to institute a private plan to 
lessen the burden of possible unemployment on his 
employees should consider doing so through a plan 
providing an individual account ~or each employee~ 
so that all employees may benefit. Such plans should 
recognize the principles essential to the operation 
of a ~ree economic system, with respect to the 
f'ollowing: 
a. To the extent such benefits increase production costs 
they must be financed out of production to be support: 
able in a competitive economy. 
b. Such plans should not undermine the incentive of a 
laid-off employee to seek new employment. · 
c. Such plans should not weaken or undermine the state 
unemployment compensation system. 
d. Money accumulated to the credit of an indiv·~ l 
employee should be the property of th luUa 
The funds should be used·to build ina1 ~mplovee. 
reserves against unemployment but th v~dUal employee 
provide that after unemployme~t-~· eed ~'b. Plan.._ should 
all accumulations would ultimat" · b 8 -~\Te 'li~en met 
disposal of the employee (or his .:t!}~lld·~~t the" 
. ~· 
-·~: 
) j 
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On this, the GIO says that union criticisms . I · 
levelled at such individual savings plans on the groU~ot,. that ~t :: 
they not only have serious shortcomings but can be util~zed to 
weaken laborrs demand for adequate pensions, vacations, or 
sickness benefits. 
Thelone voice in management ranks raised today in all-out 
favor of the guaranteed annual wage is that of Harold J. 
Ruttenberg, now president of the Stardrill-Keystone Company 
with headquarters in Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania. The company 
• is a small organization making water well drilling machines 
and has four branch plants and a subsidiary tool company. It 
,employs a total of 316 workers. 
Mr. Ruttenberg has a somewhat unique background for a 
manager. He started out as a research director of the Steel-
, workers Union and spent the war years in Washington as a dollar 
a-year official of the War Production Board. He entered manage 
ment ranks in 1946 when he became vice president of the 
Portsmouth Steel Corporation in Portsmouth, Ohio. In 1951 he 
purchased the Keystone Driller Company and in the following 
three years merged it with three other companies all in the s 
As president of a multi-plant fabricating company 
Mr. Ruttenberg now finds himself on the other side of the 
bargaining table from the United Steelworkers of America. In 
an interview with U.S. News & World Report in March, 1956 
Mr. Ruttenberg was asked to state his views on the guaranteed 
II I 
II i 
I I 
I 
'I 
11 
II II 
II 
II annual wage. His answers showed that he has not changed much lj 
lfrom the man who participated in the Steelworkers' case on the I 
!guaranteed annual wage back in 1944. 
I
I When asked if he believes in the principle of the GAW, he 
I replied' "Yes, I definitely do. I live by the year and I earn ~~ 
II by the year and I don't think we can go on indefinitely expect- 11 I. 
ing people who work in factories to be living by the month or 
1 by the week or by the hour. 11 
II 
'I Ruttenberg's policy is one of cooperating with the union. 
I 
!He feels, though, that the unions must cooperate with small 
! 
!!companies in increasing production and eliminating waste. He 
11 also feels that the unions should adopt a policy that is 
1j different for the small fabricat.ors than for a company like 
II 
II 
I 
I 
I !, 
II 
il 
t 
II li U. S. Steel. , 
,, ~~~ l In his negotiations coming up in 1956 with the USA Rutten- ,.1 
jberg will submit his own plan for a guaranteed annual wage. It I 
·I entails a gradual move toward a full guarantee of 52 weeks for IJ 
I all employees. In the first year of his plan only workers with I' 
·I five years or more seniority would be covered. Working back- ,I 
l1 wards, one year at a time, all wor kera would be covered in 
1
1 
,, I I five years time. . 
I In discussing the reaction of employees to guaranteed wage 
iplans Ruttenberg was asked what employees could do if their 
'Views and those of the national organization were different. 
I 
IHe responded: 
I I think in the main, the leaders of the union, both 
I• 
i' ,! ji 
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national and the district organizers have their ears to 
the ground.. They respond to public opinion among their I' 
I, 
membership that calls for a different course of action. 
The employer has to enunciate a program and has to work 
at creating that opinion. As it is, we confine our 
creative mental efforts to organizing sales programs 
for selling our products and selling our policies to 
the community, but we haven't gone out to sell to the 
employees, themselves, a basic labor program that is 
best for them and us.l2 I· 
'l In a 
1! question 
'I 
letter to the writer Mr. Ruttenberg responded to the 
of how hewas selling his program to his employees by 
jsaying that "it is simply a matter of leadership and being 
il 
I: 
I I . 
tfrank and honest with your people and they respond accordingly. nil 
:further details Mr. Ruttenberg declined to -~~ When pressed for 
I 
1 comment. I 
Evidently he is in a difficult position. For the worker 
I 
1 the problem of 11 dual allegiance 11 to company and union apparently!! 
works no real conf'lict. As Father Purcell says: n ••• dual 
I 
'allegiance does not necessarily mean exact obedience to the com-
~~mands of either organization but rather approval of the exist-
l,ence, basic objectives, and over-all policies of both. 11 13~ Yet 
II 1 lthese are traditionally along different lines and those in I ~management circles are supposed to have dif'f'erent goals f'rom -~ 
i!union officials. This 11 conflict'1 produces the heal thy and 
1
1 
I . I 
.!dynamic state of affairs in labor relations which most observers~~ 
IJconsider important. In Mr .. Ruttenberg's case, it may be that l 
'I 11 he is not sure himself which side he is on. II
The discussion of the pros and cons of the issue from those 1 
labor and in management has deliberately circumvented any 
I! I 
II I 
I 
)) 
-ji li 
t: 4011 
I 
- \! 
mention of the role played by the United Auto Workers. The 1 
jl reason for this is that the educational campaign inaugurated by ! 
lithat union when it decided to 11 crusade 11 for GAW reallymerits I 
I a separate discussion. 11 
I The focus of this thesis is on the approaches--communica- I 
tions-wise--which companies have taken to the issue. 
I' !i 
j! 
1 Communications-wise there has been no comparable and directly 11 
I j! ! spear-headed drive for acceptance of this issue than that put I/ 
I on by the UAW-CIO. The next chapter will deal entirely with :; 
I how this public relations program of the union was administered ll 
I i· land the results which it achieved. 
I I 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE EDUCATIONAL CAMPAIGN OF THE UAW-CIO 
The United Auto Workers depends on a 11 widespread and inten-
sive educational program to develop understanding of the Unionts 
efforts, spotlight the meaning of its progress, and build 
appreciation of the inherent and lasting value of unionism.n 
Thus opened the report of the Euucation Committee of the 
UAW-CIO submitted to the 15th Constitutional Convention of the 
Union, held March 27-April 1, 1955 in Cleveland, Ohio. 
The report continued: 
Fighting the Union every inch of the way at the bargaining 
table--forcing strikes where possible--working to take 
away through legislation much of what workers gained in 
negotiations-~companies have been carrying on year-round 
propaganda programs to try to shape the ideas of workers 
and all citizens to a corporation-dominated line. 
Managements sPend almost $3,000,000,000 on such propaganda 
efforts. Just one Corporation--General Motors--spent 
almost as much for one television program a few months 
ago, for example, as the UAW-CIO spends on its entire 
education program throughout the year. General Motors 
spends about 750 times as much a year in its drive to 
shape people's thoughts and ideals in the U. S. and 
Canada as the Union 1 s whole education program costs. 
Spread over meaningful ways of reaching people--newspapers, 
television, radio, magazines, pamphlets, leaflets, other 
media--this corporation propaganda is attempting to sway I 
people to management 1 s s.ide economically and politically. 
The Union recognizes-these attacks against free, independent 
and democratic thought and believes emphatically that 
UAW-CIO's education program must be broadened to combat 
such attacks, to dispel any apathy which may develop, and 
to further the Union 1 s progress. 
The purpose of UAW-CIO's education activities is to build 
the understanding of the issues which affect members both 
as workers and as citizens; to build membership participa-
tion in the Union; to help develop the leadership abilities 
i: ,·,,: 
I' I II 
1 li I !I 41+ ii 
1!1 
'=#=1'1 = of members and to further community understanding of 
the Union's program.l 
IThe foregoing statement of the raison d 1etre of the union's ~~ 
II Education Department gives some idea of the scope of the methoddl ,! ! 
I! which were used by the UAW to advance the cause of the 
r guaranteed annual 1ifage. I. 
1
;,11 
Actually the union program for information on the GAW 
i II 
11 involved a sharing of the responsibility by the Research and /i 
li Engineering Department headed by Nathan Weinberg. Jl 
'I As early as September, 1951 a UAW Staff Comrni ttee under the :; 
! chairmanship of Mr. Weinberg was formed by the officers of the Jl 
I ii I international union. The purpose of this group was to study ll ... 
II guaranteed wage plans already in effect and to look into the II 
I
I unemployment record of industries under contract with the union.ll 
II 
I il jAs a matter of policy the Research Department had been carefulli 
I collecting this kind of data since 1948. jll 
I I I After 18 months of studying the problem the committee came :, 
· to the conclusion that any guaranteed wage program iu the auto- I 
mobile industry would have to be 11 tailor-made to fit the needs 11 
11 of workers in (its) shops<2 I 
II 
l'j' The UAW convention held in March 1953 approved six princi- J 
II ples, 1,1 formulated by the committee on the GAW. They were: 
I 1. The primary goal of a Guaranteed Annual Wage Plan II 
1
'1 ,,,1 should be to stimulate management to provide steady, 
I full-time employment., week by week, the year round. I 
I 
2. Guaranteed Annual Wage payments should be made to I l ~ 
II 1 
I! ,I 
workers for whom management fails to provide work, in 
amounts sufficient to insure take-home pay adequate to 
maintain the living standards which the worker and his 
family enjoyed while fully employed. 
~I 
3. All workers should be guaranteed employment or 
guarantee payments from the time they acquire seniority. 
The guarantee should assure protection against a full year 
of layoff for all eligible workers and for shorter periods 
on a graduated basis for those who have not worked the 
minimum qualifying period. 
4. Guarantee payments should be integrated with state 
unemployment compensation benefits so that employers can 
reduce their liabilities by effectively working toward 
the lffiprovement of state laws. 
. ' 5. The pian should be administered by a joint board of 
administration having equal representation from the union 
and from management, with an impartial chairman to break 
deadlocks. Decisions of the Joint Board with respect to 
eligibility and disqualification should be made independ-
ently of decisions made by state agencies with regard to 
unemployment compensation. 
6. Financing should combine pay-as-you-go to provide 
employers incentives to stabilize employment, with a 
reserve trust fund to meet abnormal costs. Provision 
should be made for reinsurance to reduce the size of re-
quired reserves and to spread risks of abnormal unemploy-
II 
t! 
'I I' 
_j 4611 
ment over the widest possible area of the economy. 
At the same convention the establishn1ent of a Public 
I 
j Advisory Committee made up of ten United States and Canadian 
!I 
against the guaranteed annual wage and come up with a proposal 
that would be acceptable. 
In December of 1953, notes Unterberger, 
••• a well-publicized National UAW-CIO Full Employment 
Conference was held in Washington for which a Progress 
Report on tJ:;-e GAW was issued. In Ap,ril 1954 another 
well-public1zed UAW-CIO Education Conference was held 
in Chicago for which the main features of the union 1 s 
proposals were published in order to 11 subject every-
important element to the test of critical and even 
hostile analysis. 11 3 (Emphasis supplied). 
In 1947 Professor Snider had cautioned that before any 
II ~~ union made a demand for guaranteed employment and wages it 
1 should work up relevant data for the entire industry and for 
I the company in particular. 4 Apparently the UAW officials were 
I following his advice. 
I 
I 
II 
I 
II 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I With the general information on the guaranteed annual wage 
1 on record, the union wa.s free to concentrate on the individual I 
~panies with which it would bargain. The UAW maintains 
II 
47 
standing, separate departments for each one of the major 
companies with which it deals. The men on these staffs deal ex~ 
elusively with these companies and are experts on the operation. 
of their particular organizations. 
While the study was still going on Mr. Weinberg made a 
series of speeches on various platforms, including the American 
Management Association, the Industrial Relations Research Asso-
ciation, and the Controllers Institute of America, in which he 
outlined the union's views on GAW. 
It was his practice also to follow-up immediately with a 
letter to the editor any speech made by the llopposition11 and 
which was covered in a newspaper. 
Mr. Weinberg's own speeches pulled no punches. He told 
management audiences, among other things, 
The workers of America want the guaranteed wage and they 
are going to get it. They will get' it just as surely 
as they got pensions. If you make it necessary, they 
may acquire a lot of picket line seniority before they 
win wage guarantees. But, in the end, you will come 
to the bargaining table, pen in hand, to sign 
guaranteed wage contracts.5 
The nonsense, distortions, the confusion, and the 
irrelevancies of the Chamber of Commerce pamphl~t 
(The Economics of the Guaranteed Wage) will be repeatedly 
rehashed in the months ahead. There is obviously 
much more that could be said in answer. But I question 
whether it is worthwhile. Pamphlets of this kind are 
essentially an exercise in futility. They are not 
taken seriously by sophisticated managements faced 
with the realities of collective bargaining.6 
I would not presume to tell you how to meet your 
professional responsibilities as ·controllers in 
handling the new challenges with which you will be 
confronted when your companies sign wage guarantee 
agreements.? · 
The signing of the Ford and GM contracts did not stop the 
flow of material either from Weinberg or from the Education 
Department. In a speech made in September, 1955, before the 
State Bar of Michigan Weinberg reviewed the case made for GAW 
by the union and commented: 
As we developed our ideas, we circulated them through 
pamphlets, speeches and by various other means. Publi-
cation of our ideas was directed not only to our own 
members and the general public but also to management ••• 
The auto industry, by and large, refused to talk for 
publication on this subject. 
Publications 
One of the first booklets to be put out on the GAW was a 
small pulp book called, tt A Pay Check Every Week of the Year. 11 
-
Issued in 1952, this 4 inch by 6 inch booklet reflects the 
early thinking of the UAW on the issue. It talks about, in 
complimentary terms, the plans in effect at the Hormel, 
Procter & Gamble and Nunn-Bush companies. Although it does not 
endorse these plans completely, especially the unilaterally 
initiated Procter & Gamble plan, it is much more favorable in 
its attitude on them than later literature put out by the union. 
It is direct and simple in approach. The first page sums 
up the mood of the pamphlet: ncold weather doesn tt frighten 
us. What makes us shiver and what makes our wives get cold 
with fear is the promise of the most widely advertised depress-
ion in the history of the world. n Accompanied by cartoons 
the little book is a most effective piece of propaganda. 
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In 1953, the Progress Report on the Guaranteed Annual Wage 
Preparations was issued for the membership, completely outlining 
the plan formulated by the union. This was a mimeographed piece~ 
8 1/2 by 11 inches, still showing signs of the early stages of 
the campaign. 
But by 1954, the UAW had produced a full-blown, two-color 
booklet, selling for 5o cents, with the complete program and its 
rationale outlined in detail. This booklet, called Preparing a 
Guaranteed Employment Plan ... That Fits U .A.W. Members Like ~ 
Glove reflected several changes. It embodied the change in 
emphasis from guaranteed annual wage to the stress on Employment 
and had the appearance of a final, formalized document. This 
booklet was not sent to the entire membership, but distributed 
to local union officers and suggested for use at summer schools 1 
on the GAW throughout the country in the summer of 1954. 
In the beginning of 1955, a complete handbook embodying 
61 questions and answers about the Guaranteed Employment Plan 
was put out. The questions and answers were first published 
in the United Automobile Worker, the union's monthly newspaper, 
which goes to all members. Thus, gradually, over the four year 
period of the campaign, every member had come in contact with 
the actual provisions and arguments for the plan at least once, 
and union officers were fed a steady stream of informational 
material to acquaint them with the Plan. 
I II 111 
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1 One of the most important means which the UAW used to 
II contact members and ini'luence them on the issue was speeches ~,, 
I at local union meetings by regional Education Directors. For 
1 
i this purpose, the Education Department sent out a speaker 1 s li 
I outline and notes. It contained a point-by-point breakdown of I' 
the entire 1955 collective bargaining program of the UAW and I 
I one-hal:f o:f it was devoted exclusively to the Guaranteed I! 
I Emplo;yment Plan. 11 
1 In addition to an outline of each point in the program, th~ 
I speaker was provided with extra illustrati~e material giving J' 
i1I II case histories of laid-off workers, statistics on the number ' 
I' I 
11 of layoffs of high seniority workers in e~ery UAW local in the j 
II country, and a breakdoWn o:f financial bene:fi ts to be gained by 11 
11 the Plan. The stress in the outline was on the local situation! 
I and each regional Education Director and his staff was expected!! 
I 
to reduce the Plan to local conditions and explain it in 
1! that light. 
i 
A major educational activity of the union was the ~raining' I I 
of local union leaders. This was accomplished at s~mer I 
11 schools, weekend institutes and week-night classes. These i 
i leaders, in turn, served as instructors for rank-and-file class/! 
1
1
1 
work or discussion leaders during education programs as part ofl 
local union meetings. 
II 'I' 
11 In addition, pamphlets, posters and movies, all prepared 
__ / 
'I 
I 
!l 
II 
II 
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by the International's Education Department, were used extensive-
ly as part of the GAW education activities. 
Recently the UAW inaugurated a morning radio program callec 
11Eye Opener. 11 It is broadcast on 38 stations throughout the 
country and is aimed at first-shift workers on their way to 
work. It features union education material, as well as local 
and national unioh news, and music. 
One of the most effective informational pieces on the GAW 
put out by the union was the film entitled 11Work or Wages 
Guaranteed11 which was used to stimulate discussions and to 
clarify the principles of the Plan. 
Whenever possible Walter Reuther himself addressed local 
education conferences on the Guaranteed Employment Plan to stir 
up interest in the union goal. He was present at the December, 
1955 conference of Region 9 (New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and 
New York State (except N.Y.C.) held at the Commodore Hotel in 
New York City. Approximately 250 local union leaders from 
these t~~ee states attended the sessions. 
This kind of activity was going on simultaneously in all 
other parts of the country. 
As the 1955 bargaining period approached, the union's 
activities were intensified. Reuther's opening speech at the 
Constitutional Convention in March of that year was mainly an 
impassioned plea for support of the Plan. He declared: 
We will not go to the bargaining table just as a routine 
matter of another bargaining session. We are going 
there knowing that this is a crusade--a crusade to gear 
economic abundance to human needs. We plan to give 
i: 
11 
=-_ j_ 
II 
I management a little bit of the vision that we have. We would like to show them that great new world that 
can be built if free labor,and free management and 
free government and free people can cooperate together 
in harmony in harnessing the powers of America and I 
gearing that power to the basic needs of people. We I 
hope that they will grasp that vision which is essential 
to the leadership in this great world crisis. There is lJ 
no limit to the great progress that we can make, 1 
because human progress is as unlimited as the creative 1 
1 genius of the free human spirit.8 I 
1J To the nmoral 11 appeal of the Guaranteed Emplo-yment Plan wad, 
I added a f'inancial tone. One of' the major purposes of' this con-I! 
\vention was a vote on the establishment of a $25 million strike I 
I fund to be set aside in case of need over the guaranteed annual 
!wage issue. Delegates to the convention had been elected 
~~primarily on platf'orms f'or and against the $5-a-month dues I 
1l increase which would create the major part of the fund in the I! 
I I' 
1 three months between the date of the convention and the opening 1\ 
I 
1
/ of negotiations with the automobile industry. j 
1 The object of setting up the strike fund was to show the iJ 
I II 
automobile industry that the union meant to go through with its II 
I strike threat if no agreement could be reached on its Plan. 
! This same convention also approved a resolution on the 
!Guaranteed Employment Plan itself. The text of the resolution 
I 
I listed a history of the UAW 
I 
guaranteed wage mo~ement starting 
with the 1951 mandate, of the 13th Constitutional Convention 
1. that GAW 
1J The text 
I! 
II 
be the union 1 s next major collective bargaining goal. 
continued: 
II li 
No demand ever advanced by our Union has been subjected 
to more prolonged and intensive discussion by the rank-
and-file membership at union meetings, in the plants--
at conferences, institutes and classes than has the 
il 
I 
·I 
II 
li 
I' II 
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demand for Guaranteed Annual Employment. For four 
years at all levels of·our Union, both the objective 
and its implementation have been exrumined, analyzed 
and studied in preparation for 1955 negotiations.9 
The fact that the union was watching the plants in the 
automobile industry was vividly shown by its picking up a 
53 
questionnaire which was being used to interview General Motors 
workers on the GAW. In February of 1955 the Union secured 
copies of the questionnaire, which was reported to have been 
drawn up by the Opinion Research Corporation for General Motors, 
and sent copies to more than 400 professional poll takers. 
These men were asked if they thought the questions were biased. 
Both GM and the Opinion Research Corporation have refused 
to comment on any connection that they might have had with this 
questionnaire. 
Yet questions 33 and 34 of the alleged GM questionnaire 
circulated by the union ask: Have you heard or read anything 
about plans for providing workers with guaranteed annual wages 
or guaranteed annual employment? If yes, where did you hear 
about such a plan? 
And, the statistics cited by Hugh Rusch, Opinion Research 
vice president, at the June NAM meeting on GAW, (see Chapter II, 
p. ~) relate to that question. If Opinion Research did not 
do the GM survey, it has done something similar somewhere. 
As of June, 1956 General Motors refuses to comment on 
whether it nas ever used such a device. Information-seeking 
from employees hardly seems something to be a»hamed of, and in 
.. 
contrast with the extremely well-publicized activities of the 
I! 
i! 
i! 
II 
,, 
II 
II union, gives rise to a rather peculiar picture of 
II attitude on this subject. 
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management's IJ 
\ 
1 As with Weinberg's speeches, the material from the Educa- I 
1 
1 tion Department on GAW, now universally called SUB by the 
I union, continues to flow. The June 19.55 issue of Ammunition, 
I UAW' s monthly magazine, carried an ecstatic lead article on I 
·I 
I 
i 
the signing of the contracts, a three-page article on questions it 
! 
and answers about SUB as contained in the new contracts, and a 
1
/ 
blow-by-blow description of a debate between UAW Vice President !i 
I 
Leonard Woodcock, and William J. Grede, chairman of the Finance 
ColliDlittee of the National Association of Manufacturers. 
1
j 
The July 19.55 issue of the United Automobile Worker !I 
proclaimed on page one, "UAW Economic Pattern--Including GAW-- ·1 
Spreading, 11 and inside carried stories on the latest companies r 
to sign contracts embodying SUB. A major story told of a probei 
asked for by Reuther into any price increases in the automobile! 
II 
industry which the companies might claim to have been necessi- I 
tated by contract agreements. 
In September, just after the contract between the UAW and 
Chrysler Corporation was signed, the National Chrysler Depart- 1 I 
ment of the union published a four-page newspaper for the 
workers explaining completely the provisions of the contract. II 
Also in September, with the signing of the contract with 
II 
Allis Chalmers Company, Woodcock issued a statement calling the jl 
agreement nthe best so far negotiated with any major corporatio! I 
I! 
11 in the United States. n 
' . ~ 
. I 
L. 
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A review of the immediate pre-bargaining and post-
bargaining periods involving GAW was given in the January, 1956 
issue of Ammunition, which presented a month-by-month account 
of the union's activities for 1955. At every point along the 
way there are evidences that a complete communications program 
was going forward at all times. 
The Research and Education Department of the CIO produced, 
in the early months of 1956, a pamphlet describing the progress 
of the GAW issue. It is directed primarily at CIO unions other 
' 
than the UAW. An indication that the combined AFL-CIO is 
solidly behind the principle of GAW came from an article in the 
New York Herald Tribune, June 20, 1956, describing a telegram 
from George Meany, AFL-CIO president, to David McDonald, 
president of the Steelworkers, giving him the backing of the 
entire labor organization in his dealings with the basic steel 
industry. One of the major demands of the steel union was for 
52 weeks of supplementary unemployment compensation. 
Thus, the four-year campaign succeeded. Unterberger says~ 
There is little question that the union's careful 
preparation contributed substantially to their success 
in winning from the automobile companies some kind of 
guaranteed wage which in this case took the form of 
supplementary unemployment pay. Certainly the extra-
ordinary prosperity in the automobile industry in 1955 
and the production race between Ford and GM which made 
them reluctant to risk a strike also contributed to 
the unionTs rather rapid success.lO 
A combination of determination, good timing and excellent 
communications did the job for the UAW. 
What were the companies involved in some of these 
negotiations doing in the meantime? That is the area which 
will now be explored. The three approaches which companies 
seemed to gravitate to will be looked at with accompanying 
analysis of the kinds of communication which were issued both 
before and after negotiations. It will be helpful to keep in 
mind during this discussion that all this time the UAW was 
hammering away at the public and at its own members (these 
companiest workers) on the advisability of the GAW. 
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CHAP.rER V 
THREE MANAGEMENT APPROACHES TO THE GUARANTEED ANNUAL WAGE 
Introduction 
The way that any management reacts to a specific bargaining 
issue will, of course, depend on its over-all labor relations 
philosophy. And, although this reaction might be ·different for 
each company depending on factors such as the relationship with 
its union, the strength of the union leadership, the positive or 
negative role which the chief executive of the company is wont 
to play, and the economic and competitive position of the 
company at the time of negotiations, several npatternstt of 
collective bargaining have emerged from negotiations covering 
all of the major industries over the last few years. 
Robert McMurry, senior partner, McMurry Hamstra Company, 
a consultant specializing in industrial relations, has reduced 
these patterns to four.l 
The first of these he calls 11Boulwareism, 11 after Lemuel R. , 
Boulware, the vice president in charge of public relations of 
General Electric Company. This approach he says, is character-
ized by a rather 11 intransigentH attitude toward unions. In 
practice what happens is that management tends to bypass the 
union and communicate directly with its employees on its day-to-
day problems. It also attempts to win its employees' allegiance 
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in competition with the union by showing them that it is inter-
ested in their welfare and is doing all it can to promote it. 
It is firm in negotiating with the union--it makes an 
offer which it claims is feasible and then refuses to backdown 
or retract in any way. And, as a final step, it communicates 
its offer directly to its workers and the public independently 
of the union. 
The second approach McMurry calls ncrawfordism.u The 
prototype of this approach is Fred Crawford, president of 
Thompson Products, in Cleveland. 'Says McMurry: 11 Mr. Crawford 
is a living example of a dynamic industrial leader who feels 
that the best way to deal with a union is to do such a good and 
realistic job of holding employees' loyalties that they feel 
no real need for a union. n 
In terms of communications, Crawford maintains an effective 
11hear-all and tell-alltl communications set up to keep everyone 
informed. 
In mar:Ked contrast to these two approaches which are 
relatively individualistic, are 11Fairlessness11 and ttstudebaker-
·-
ism. n The former is based on a philosophy of 11 living with the 
.. 
union11 formulated by Benjamin Fairless, former chairman of the 
board of U. S. 'Steel, and with it management limits its commu-
nications to employees to union channels or to joint company-
union channels. Studebakerism goes even further in its 
catering to the union's role. It gives the union an active 
voice in management policies. 
II 
'! 
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McMurry is critical, in turn, of each of these approaches--
of the first two because management does too much; of the last 
two because managements are unrealistic in expecting the good 
will of the union to carry over into situations where the chips 
are down and the outcome of negotiations may determine the 
survival of either union or management. 
But for the purposes of this thesis, the breakdown is a 
helpful one. General Electric Company will be dealt with sepa-
rately and it will be shown just how Mr. Boulware's policies 
are carried out down the line. The recent negotiations of the 
basic steel companies with the United Steelworkers of America 
exemplify the results of the Fairless approach over the last 
few years. The role of a vigorous and dynamic chief executive 
will be brought out in a study of the Maytag Company. 
There are several general statements which can be made 
about the over-all management approach. In the main, there is 
no comparison between the amount of material disseminated by 
the unions and that of companies involved. One reason for this 
i 
could be partly legal, in that taking a stand on an issue before 
negotiations could be construed as a refusal to bargain collect-
ively and be subject to censure under the Taft-Hartley law. 
This has not seemed to be the main reason behind managementts 
refusal to talk, however. 
It has been suggested2 that any management recognition of 
the subject lends dignity to the demand and gives the impression 
======~~=====================================================F======== 
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that it should be taken seriously. That unions have been takin 
it seriously for the past five years has already been 
demonstrated . 
Another group of management people who recognize that 
ignoring the issue will not make it disappear have been reluct-
ant to talk because they felt that timing was of great import-
ance in the ideological war over GAW. 
But, as the Bureau of National Affairs points out: 
Most management discussion of GAW has been confined to 
forums, made up largely of management personnel who, 
it must be believed, are already firmly in opposition 
to this union goal. While some of this is reported in 
the public press, relatively little--compared to the 
volume of union literature distributed directly to 
members--gets to employees.3 
The BNA goes on to say that while managements can't seem to 
make up their minds about the desirability of reaching employees, 
I :::e::::~ ::::•:u::~v::::.t:0a::::r::a::et::::r:;;::t:rt:ducat- I, 
stabilize operations and the problems they entail in doing so. 
That management people are not convinced about communica-
tions was commented on in a recent issue of Advertising Age. 
Robert Newcomb and Marg Sammons, employee relations consultants, 
I 
discussed a collective bargaining conference held by the America 
Management Association in March, 1956 which dealt at length with 
GAW. Say the Newcombs: 
One tragedy marked the conference. One could count 
the communications people of companies on the fingers 
of one hand. Perhaps their companies did not feel 
the conference had any particular bearing on communi-
cations; possibly communications people by-passed it L __ ==ll===========jl-
themselves because of a cool interest in the subject. 
Unfortunately communications people generally know 
too little about negotiating; they concern themselves 
with the niceties of writing and the slick appearance 
of their printed products. They would do better to 
burrow into management-labor relations, where the needs 
are the greatest.4 
It is hard to believe that managements would expect 
information to sift down to the workers automatically, and 
inconceivable that they could be sure, without a concrete 
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program, that supervisors would have the time and the ability 
to do this job. Since, in addition, it would be the employees 
who would back the union in a strike over the issue, the almost 
complete silence which has characterized the companies in the 
automobile and steel industries, in particular, is rather 
incomprehensible. 
It is also interesting to note that in Father Purcellls 
study of Swift and Company and its union, the United Packing-
house Workers (CI0),5 many of the foremen were the union's chief 
supporters. This did not necessarily imply that they were 
disloyal to the company but that they too, in the last analysis, 
were workers who benefitted from gains made by the union. 
In industrial relations circles the advisability of dis-
cussion on the topic was set forth by Industrial Relations 
Counselors, Inc., in its Memo No. 131, dated October 1, 19.53. 
Said the Memo: I 
When all reasonable steps have been taken to stabilize I 
employment in a company, and full information as to those 
steps has been given to employees and their representatives 
management will be better prepared to approach collective 
bargaining negotiations on the guaranteed annual wage . 
..Ern: a.s.iJL-.S..U: _ tlie_d.... ____ _ 
before negotiations and which have kept even explanatory 
material at a minimum following their contract's signing. 
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The second section deals with a company (General Electric) 
which has followed a vigorous policy of work stabilization and 
has not hesitated to communicate on its progress. Its 
pronouncements on the guaranteed wage, per se, have been few 
but emphatic. Its main approach is a 11posi tive 11 one--with 
steady work provided there will be no need to 11protectu workers 
from layoffs. 
The third way utilizes the same techniques as the UAW did-
for the purpose of combatting the guaranteed annual wage. That 
a company campaign can be successful is attested to by the 
history of the Maytag Company's fight. 
Notable for years in the battle against GAW is the Timken 
Roller Bearing Company of Canton, Ohio, which has never ceased 
to rail publicly against guarantees. 
NO COMMUNICATIONS BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS--MINIMUM AFTERWARDS 
The Ford Motor Company 
i 6U I 
As the first major corporation to sign a contract contain-
ing the supplementation of unemployment compensation principle, 
the Ford Motor Company has been in the spotlight since June 
19..55. Much discussion has been elicited by that 11historic 11 
contract, most of it to determine whether or not the UAW got a 
guaranteed annual wage. 
The union says it did get one. (Ironically, the NAM which 
on this issue has never agreed with the union, says they 
did, too). Ford spokesmen say, emphatically, that they did not 
grant the guaranteed annual wage. 
This question remains largely academic. The UAW has 
apparently convinced its membership (and the general public as 
well) that GAW and SUB are the same things. It apparently also 
inspired the United Steelworkers to go for the same provisions 
in its contracts with the basic steel industry. 
Ford is one of the companies which, while npioneering" 
many fringe benefits (it was the first large company to grant 
pensions in 1949) has done so only after extreme public prodding! 
by the union. In addition, its practice has been that of 
reacting to union demands rather than initiating a program of 
its own. In line with this collective bargaining policy has 
come a reluctance to talk about any issue before negotiations 
and to keep employee communications at a minimum even after 
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agreements are signed. 
One reason for this may be a fear of being quoted later in 
a different context. John Bugas, vice president--industrial 
relations, said.at a recent American Management Association 
meeting6 11 ••• your words often can and do come back to haunt you 
across the bargaining table. Changing circumstances have a way 
of giving your words quite a different sense than the one you 
thought they had. 11 
It is hard to find any evidence of Ford's communications 
to employees before.negotiations. It has been pointed out 
earlier that the "Ford Plan11 for SUB was not offered at the 
bargaining table until the last possible minute. It seems 
reasonable to assume that the company would just as soon not 
have introduced SUB, if any other way had seemed feasible. 
The June 9, 19_5.5 issue of the Rouge News headlined the 
contract story, nFord Once Again Leads the Way in Granting 
·-
E'mployee Benefits. 11 The public relations department put out a 
pamphlet explaining the terms of the plan, with opening state-
ments by Henry Ford II and Mr. Bugas. Said Ford: 
In some quarters it (the Plan) has been likened to 
the union demand for a 11 Guaranteed Annual Wageu 
which it is not. It has been both lavishly praised 
and severely condemned in the press and by various 
industrial spokesmen .•• Ford Motor Company has a long 
tradition of pioneering. The present management is 
proud to add to this tradition by taking a realistic 
approach to the problems faced by our people during 
layoff periods. 
--=-=-=ll===--=-=--===============tl ___ _ r----
i 
66l 
Bugas commented in the same pamphlet! 
The 11Guaranteed Annual Wage11 as it has been enunciated 
by the UAW or anything resembling the 11Guaranteed 
Annual Wage" as enunciated by the UAW was wrong 
economically, socially and morally. As a matter of 
fact, it became apparent fairly early in the negotia-
tions that the UAW itself was uncertain about many 
aspects of its Guaranteed Annual Wage and did not 
have clearly in mind a practicable means to accomplish 
its ultimate and extreme objectives. 
This booklet for public consmnption is the only thing that 
Ford sent outside the company. For its own employees it has 
prepared a booklet explaining the workings of the plan. The 
employee booklet was timed to coincide with the first payments 
to be made under the plan as of June, 1956. For its management 
people Ford also prepared a film on the workings of the plan 
but discarded it after a few showings. 
Regardless of what Ford says now, to its employees or to I 
the public, the impression has been made that the concessions onl 
SUB were wrung out of the company by a determined and sagacious 
union leadership. And the safeguards which the company built 
into the plan (trust fund financing rather than pay-as-you-go; 
rate of payments based on trust fund position; complete manage-
ment rather than union-management control} may cause many union 
members to be dissatisfied and to press for further concessions 
at the next negotiations. 
It is unlikely that a changing opinion on the part of the 
workers when the realization that the plan, after all, does not 
guarantee a great deal this year, will work against the union. 
If the company continues to remain silent, the union will get 
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the mandate from the workers to go after more. 
General Motors Corporation 
According to a statement by a member of the public rela-
tions department at General Motors the only communications whic 
GM directed to its employees on GAW came in the story of the 
contract signing which appeared in the company's house organ, 
GM Folks. The same story appeared in several of the newspapers 
put out by GM divisions, and bulletin board notices of the 
signing were also posted. 
In the story on the signing, Harlow Curtice, GM president, 
commented: 
The supplemental unemployment benefit plan which the 
UAW-CIO has bean granted is exceedingly complicated 
and will require some time to appraise fully. We 
still hold earnestly to the belief that the responsi-
bility for such matters as the amount and duration 
of unemployment compensation benefits rests with the 
legislatures of the various states. 
The three pages of the article are devoted mainly to a 
discussion of the provisions of the new contract. The SUB plan 
is covered in a two-paragraph explanation and there is no 
further editorial comment. The piece in the GM Folks was pre-
pared by the house organ staff with the cooperation of the 
labor relations section. The public relations staff at GM has 
little, if anything, to do with pronouncements to employees on 
this subject, according to the source previously cited. And GM 
makes no attempt to take credit for the Plan--in their words 
it is a 11Ford Plantt which they were forced to accept. 
American Can Company 
An example of a company which did not communicate with 
~ employees before negotiations but has decided to do so on the 
SUB issue in the period following the contract signing is 
American Can Company. The philosophy of the industrial rela-
tions department at Canco is that the line supervisor is the 
chief channel through which all communications must flow. 
Until recently, the public and industrial relations 
departments have been combined. Now, most of the external 
public relations activities of the company are handled by a 
public relations consultant, while the industrial relations 
division deals with employees. 
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E. T. Klassen, general manager, industrial relations, has 
made several public appearances explaining his company•s 
approach to supervisors. At an American Management Association 
Special Conference on Supervision, held in November, 1955, 
Klassen said: 
The foreman ought to know the whole story. He needs 
to know the management and union purposes behind 
demands and counter-demands; the compromises; the 
explanation; the examples; the apologies; the promises • 
•.. To make good as his own departmentts employee-
relations expert, the foreman must not only talk about, 
but also prove, that top management readlly and truly 
wants its employees to be secure, to be satisfied, 
and to make a profit on their investment of time, 
skill and effort. There are many ways for top manage-
ment to try to communicate this message to employees. 
But the foreman, over and beyond what he says on this 
subject, can do two extra things that no publication, 
no speech, no plant tour by plant bosses can ever do; 
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first the foreman can listen~ which is the other half 
of the communication process that we too often miss. 
~lllen the foreman really listens, then he can communi-
cate back up the management line. That is, if anybody 
at the other end is listening, and if it has been made 
clear to the foreman that his voice is welcome on the 
management party line. 
In line with this very clear-cut policy, American Can 
Company communicated directly with line supervisors during the 
negotiations with the United Steelworkers in August, 1955. 
As soon as negotiations began, equipment necessary for communi-
cations: mimeographs for overnight mailings to branch plants, 
wire services, and a roster of home phone numbers for weekend 
and night-time use, were set up. All communications given to 
the press were sent by wire to general and division offices, 
district sales offices, and Steelworker plants. 
The supervisors receiving the communiques were authorized 
to release them to the local press, if they were asked for 
information. A description of the progress of the negotiations 
was thus submitted to all those concerned. 
In cases where telegrams referred to union proposals, 
copies of illustrative material were sent along. With the 
announcement of the signing of the contract (six weeks before 
the old contract expired) went a copy of the companyts press 
release; an unofficial explanation of the supplemental 
unemployment benefit plan; and the revised pension plan. 
No notice of the contract signing appeared in either the 
monthly house organ, Canco, or the Management Newsletter. 
-===~===-====---===ll===l 
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\ Neither of these media has ever been used as a management 
1. platform. The industrial relations staff is considering 
broadening the scope of Canco to include, perhaps, a letter by 
i 
the president, or some form of management communication directl 
to employees. 
Another item for the future is the development of an 
employee newsletter to go directly to workers. Members of the 
IR staff feel that this is something that is needed at American 
Can Company. 
For the immediate future and the SUB, the company is pre-
1
1
. paring a manual on the plan and. its operation. No payments can 
be made under the plan until October 1, 1956, and the manual 
llwill be published in time to cover any administrative problems, 
)1 should payments be necessary at that time because of layoffs. 
I! 
II 
The manual will be distributed to all employees and will 
j be an integral part of the literature which new employees 
receive at orientation time. The plan for distribution of the 
1 man and to anticipate any questions which may arise. 
I i Continental Can Company 
ii 
l 
I Bargaining in the can industry, like that in the automobile 
industry, took place on a pattern-setting basis. The two major 
ll 
I 
1
1 can cD!llpanies··American Can and Continental Can··agreed to 
!!substantially the same provisions (with a few exceptions in the 
I 
!method of financing} of the SUB plan submitted by the United 
i I Steelworkers of America. 
I Like its competitor, Continental Can did not communicate 
\with employees on the issue of employee security, the guaranteed 
I annual wage, or anything relating to it before negotiations. 
!But, at the request of the union,. it had made a study of its 
I 
I layoff record and estimated costs, to determine just how much 
of a guarantee would be feasible to grant. 
on bargaining issues is confined largely to union or to joint 
I 
r 
I 
I 
union-management channels. Even in the case of the announcement! 
, of the contract signing, the company issued nothing directly 
I 
1 to employees. 
I It expected that workers would read the news in the papers 
Jbased on the company1 s press releases and that the union would 
I . 
I[ explain the actual plan. A booklet on the plan and its provi-
1 sions, along with a question and answer sheet was prepared for 
!public distribution to take care of the volume of inquiries 
!after the contract signing. 
Now in production is a 44-minute (with short intermission) 
sound slide movie in color to explain how the SUB plan works. 
I . lj It will be shown to management staff at headquarters and 
I. 
il 
ll 
I 
11 divisional management throughout the country. The purpose of 
I 
I showing the film to management people is to solicit discussion 
I I on possible changes in personnel policy in various plants as a 
Jresult of the initiation of the plan. According to current 
!plans, the film will be shown later to all foremen to acquaint 
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them completely with the plan. This will be accomplished before 
.!October 1, 19.56 when the plan goes into effect. 
! Also before October 1 the industrial relations department 
!will prepare a booklet for employees on how the plan works. 
IAt that time stories in plant newspapers will complete the 
~information to be given directly to workers. 
All communications to employees at Continental Can are the 
province of the industrial relations department. Under its 
I jurisdiction are the editor of the monthly headquarters magazin~ 
land those dealing with all personnel and labor relations 
II functions. . 
II 11 Public relations 11 is combined with advertising and is 
lresponsible for community and press relations functions. The 
I 
11 short section on SUB in the company's annual report to stock-
J, 
liholders was submitted by the industrial relations department to 
!I the treasurer 1 s office, which handles the over-all report. 
I Although,there is some liaison between the industrial 
relations and public relations departments in the company, it 
l
is relatively slight. 
The actual administration of the SUB Plan is now being 
1
handled by one man, recently transferred from a division to the 
I 
I 
II 
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head office for the sole purpose of coordinating activities 
on SUB. A feature story on the new head of the plan appeared 
in the house organ. Likewise appearing in the magazine~ for 
employees' information, are reports of the activities of the 
public relations department relating to institutional 
advertising. 
THE POSITIVE APPROACH--EMPHASIS ON STEADYWORK 
General Electric Company 
According to a company spokesman, GE• s 11communications on 
steady work do not represent any over-all campaign to 'answer' 
the guaranteed wage demand, but instead are a reflection of our 
over-all approach to employee communications in which we advo-
cate communication on all company matters, so far as is 
practicable, which are of vi tal concern to employees. n 
That the company has not initiated its steady work 
programs as an 11 answer" to GAW is apparent, since its emphasis 
on work stabilization pre-dates any union proposal for a 
guarantee. That, in practice, this concern for and publicity 
on stabilization has stood the company in good stead in its 
dealings with union representatives cannot be denied, however. 
In looking at GE's approach to collective bargaining on 
the one hand, and its obvious interest in its employees' 
security on the other, it will be necessary to break the 
analysis into two parts. To find out the position of the 
company, one can look at its pronouncements on GAW and into its 
philosophy of communications, and secondly into the material 
which has appeared in its plant newspapers on the question of 
steady work. 
This latter effort involves newspapers at three locations: 
Lynn, Massachusetts; Louisville, Kentucky; and Schenectady, 
New York. 
The approach of Lemuel R. Boulware--sometimes called 
11Boulwareism, 11 --has been described briefly in the introduction 
to this section. It is based on a philosophy of doing what the \ 
company thinks is right for employees and doing it voluntarily. 
As Fortune commented: tt ••• he refuses to let labor leaders take 
him into a smoke-filled room and then make it appear that they 
have clubbed concessions out of the company.n7 
His approach to employee relations is that of a customers-
relation problem in marketing. The job itself is looked on as 
if it were a product--analyzed, refined, and if necessary, 
remodeled to please employees. 
The complete confidence of GE top management in this 
approach is borne out by the fact that Boulware has recently 
added public relations to his jurisdiction, along with his 
former responsibility for employee and plant community 
relations. 
Business Week commented on the merger of functions! 
11Boulware foresees a better job of convincing shareholders, 
customers, employees, other businessmen and the general public 
that GE is operating in the 1balanced best interests' of all 
concerned.n8 
75 
~ 
I 
1 The job of coordinating communications to all of these I 
publics is no mean task when one considers that GE is the fourt,L 
/I largest publicly held U. S. Industrial in sales and the nation' 
iJthird-largest employer.9 Over the past five years, the company 
lhas carried on a tremendous decentralization program, giving 
'almost complete authority to department heads in the different 
locations, subject to a few company-wide policies. 
Local communications on employee relations issues are 
supplemented by material coming from Employee Relations Services 
I in New York which filters down to every level of management. 
I· A potent tool for passing on information to management is 
II the Employee Relations Newsletter.. The May 5, 1954 issue, 
I 
I 
j dealing with the guaranteed annual wage, has been widely circu-
j lated and is regarded as the official company approach to 
I 
1 that issue. 
II The Newsletter takes up, one by one, the peculiar problems 
I' inherent in a company making a diversified ~ine of products, 
and records its efforts in trying to meet these problems and 
I 
still maintain steady jobs. 
GE's two excursions into the area of guarantees of work 
I 
and wages are discussed briefly. In 1931 the company initiated 
I a 11 stabilization of employment plan11 in twelve Lamp Department 
I plants wherein 50 weeks of work per year were guaranteed to 
I 
II employees with two yedrs or more of service. The plan was 
II 
II 
discontinued in 1938, with the adoption of state unemployment 
compensation plans. 
A flfixed weekly wage plann was introduced in the Decatur 
(Ind.) fractional horsepower motor plant in 1936. It was 
based on estimated production but it was found that accurate 
predictions were impossible to make, and the plan was dis-
continued when nintolerablen inventories piled up. 
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The Newsletter takes the IUE-CIO proposal for GAW (essen-
tially the same as that of the UAW) and gives ten reasons why 
it has been rejected by GE. 11 ••• we are forced to conclude that 
the latest IUE-CIO demand--or any such privately negotiated, 
selective, discriminatory, non-universal type of coverage--is 
wrong in principle,n the Newsletter states. 
The company suggested, instead, that the best way toward 
steady pay is through steady work and proper unemployment 
compensation benefits when there is no work. It stated its 
objective of helping to 11 promote steadily mounting progress in 
economic well-being and human welfare by means of all feasible 
intensifying of the innovation, improvement, expansion and 
promotion of products and services for which a market exists or 
can be profitably created. 11 
This issue of the Newsletter actually summarizes the 
arguments which company negotiators had made to union officials 
during the bargaining sessions. As a result of the company's 
f.;irm stand the demand for GAW was not pursued further in the 
1954 negotiations. 
In spite of the achievement of SUB in the automobile 
industry only two months before, GE 1 s 1955 negotiations were 
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successfully completed without any change in the company's 
position. The one mention of SUB is in a reopener clause of 
the five-year contract which calls for a 11 reviewn of employment 
-
security matters for a 30-day period in 1958. At that time the 
union may request discussion of the issue not more than sixty 
and not less than thirty days in advance of October 1. 
The GE press release on the contract quotes the proposal 
letter accompanying the company offer to the union! 
•.• from anything we can now see or anticipate, we 
will three years from now be just as firm in our 
conviction as we were last year and this year that 
unemployment compensation supplementation or any 
other similar proposals of this nature are not in 
the balanced best interests of all concerned in 
General Electric. 
There is no lack of material on the why and wherefore of 
the GE approach. In a sum-up of its employee, plant community 
and union relations department's progress from its inception in 
10 -1947 to the end of 1954 the rationale behind the adoption of 
its special brand of communications is stated: 
Skillful propaganda by certain union officials and 
other of our critics had filled the communication 
void created by the traditional reluctance of our-
selves and other businessmen to speak up about 
our good intentions and performance ..•• 
..• we decided that we 
our offers when made. 
and ~eighbors advised 
including any changes 
union representatives 
developments. 
should and would publicize 
We would keep our employees 
of the course of negotiations--
in our offers in response to 
or by reason of any other 
While the Employee Relations Newsletter goes mainly to 
management people, other publications are directed toward all 
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employees. One of these is the Commentator, containing messages 
of interest to all employees and community leaders. The 
Commentator for August 12, 1955, issued the day GE made its off6 
to the union, featured an ad on ttMore and Better and Steadier I 
Jobs" stressing the need f.or maintenance of production standards I 
by each worker. 
The company has consistently kept its employees informed 
on its efforts to maintain steady work and its progress in 
union relations through the medium of plant newspapers. 
In Lynn, Massachusetts, coverage of the 1955 negotiations 
was begun prior to the actual talks with the printing of a 
company statement on the points which it felt concerned all 
employees. That statement, appearing in the July 22 issue of 
the River Works News, said in part: 
Over the past year some of the unions have been 
publicizing to you the demands with which they 
apparently intend to open the bargaining. Whether 
these demands are realistic or not for the best 
interests of all of us in our situation is something 
that will naturally be ex~ined thoroughly in the 
bargaining ahead. While some of the union officials 
give the customary impression that they are adamant 
in both their usual and unusual demands, more and 
more of the representatives of the 90-odd unions 
have demonstrated that after sober consideration 
they want to arrive at a settlement that is sensibly 
and genuinely in the interests of all concerned. We 
know from past experience that this is the kind of 
a settlement you want, too. · 
The next week 1 s issue (July 29) carried a news story on 
the continuance of the talks. In addition, an editorial 
captioned, 11Not One--But Five, 11 said in part: 
GE tries at all tlffies to be pro-customer, pro-employee, 
pro-shareowner, pro-supplier, and pro-public, and in 
so doing reviews the facts to serve the best interests 
of the American public as a whole. Occasionally, some 
individuals voice the very human and understandable 
desire for what proves on examination to be more than 
their proper share--and fqr what would thus be at the 
unfair expense of other claimants and contributors. 
When this happens GE helps develop common understanding 
of the facts by all concerned. 
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The complete GE offer to the UE and IUE appeared in the 
August 12 issue of the paper. It outlined all of the benefits 
which were offered and the value of fringe benefits was pointed 
up in that issue's editorial. A complete explanation of the 
11 lack of worktt plan worked out by the local IUE union and the 
company also appeared in this paper. 
The reporting of these subjects is a far cry from the 
philosophy that assumes that the union will tell the employees 
about it anyway, so why duplicate? This, incidentally, is a 
practice in some companies using the nFairlessness 11 approach. 
Fol2owing up in the next week's issue were separate 
articles on the pension and insurance provisions of the new 
contract offer and a centerfold ad reiterating all 32 provisions 
of the offer. 
By August 25, the Lynn IUE local (201} had voted "over-
whelmingly11 to accept this offer and became the sixth large 
local in the country to ratify the plan. The IUE-CIO confer-
ence board officials meeting in New York were at that time 
waiting for a two-thirds majority approval of local unions 
go ahead with formal ratification of the contract for all 
GE IUE-CIO represented employees. 
The formal signing of the contract was announced in the 
September 2 issue of the News. Thus the plan and its provision 
received continuous coverage by the company organ for almost 
two months of bargaining. 
The guaranteed annual wage issue has not been dropped 
completely. In the February 10, 1956 issue of the newly 
decentralized Ganeral Electric News for the Small Aircraft 
Engine Department at Lynn, a two-column, bold-face story raised 
the issue and asked seven quesbions on the way a guarantee 
would work. Said the article: 
••• it is impossible to discuss them all at one 
writing, but we'll raise some of them (questions} 
this week and discuss them in later issues. 
Commenting on the signing of the Ford contract, the 
June 10, 1955 issue of GE News for the Major Appliance Division 
, at Louisville, Kentucky reprinted an editorial from the 
:Wall =S...;;.t.;;;..r..;:.e..::;.et-=- Journal on the guaranteed annual wage. The Journal 1---
had this to say! 
By contrast with the Ford offer (presumably the 
stock-option plan) the settlement the union demanded 
and got is a throwback to a darker age of labor 
relations. 
In Schenectady the News began its own local campaign to 
explain the company's bargaining views on July 8. An editorial 
in the issue began! nWho wins in a strike? The answer is 
obviously nobody wins. tt 
.e 
81 
!I 
lj The lead story on July 22 in Schenectady was about the 
1
1 open.;ng of negot~at~ons. ~  ~ Sharing the spotlight on page one was 
1
1 the story of GE 1 s record high sales performance in the first 
I half of 1955. A variation of the ttNot One--But Fivett editorial 
I which appeared in the July 29 issue of the Lynn paper, was 
II featured in this issue. 
j1 A bulletin in the July 29 issue noted that in discussions 
I with eight Schenectady unions which bargain locally uno general 
interest has been expressed in the so-called guaranteed annual 
lt wage ••• 
Editorializing on the company offer in the August 19 
! 
! issue GE said! 11 IUE-CIO bargainers recognized the absolute 
I 
I fairness of the company offer and recommended unanimous accept-
! 
I ance by the union conference board. 11 · 
j As in Lynn, subsequent issues followed up with detailed 
II explanations of several facets of the fringe benefits provided 
I under the new contract. In addition to using the papers to 
i 
I I report on actual negotiations, GE, as noted earlier, makes good 
1 use of the space to bring home, week after week, results which 
are being achieved in the area of security and steady work. 
II Over the ten-month period (February-December, 1955) the 
!
!Schenectady News carried continuous notices of company progress 
Among the facts reported were: 
I 
1 .The company 1 s achievement in fabricating diamonds for 
the first time in history and the new vistas opened for 
the organization as a result 
I! 
jl 
II 
II 
II 
I 
.The growth of employment in the company--GE jobs 
increased nearly 7 times .faster than the population 
o.f Schenectady County and over 3 times faster than 
the nation 1 s civilian work force 
.The acquisition of new orders resulting in more jobs 
.Expansion projects for improved .facilities 
.The dedication of a new Research Laboratory 
.The appearance of GE president, Ralph J. Cordiner, 
at a congressional hearing at which he declared 
that automation would have a "stimulating and 
stabilizing effect on the national economy and 
employment.tt 
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Simultaneously with the recording of the company'~ progress 
jin one paper, plant 
,!engaged in somewhat 
media in other parts of the country were 
the same procedure. 
I The General Electric employee can hardly complain that 
"no one ever tells me anything. 11 If anything, he is deluged 
jwith material, but at least knows at all times how the company 
I 
1 stands on most issues. 
A good summary of the ways that GE uses to reach its 
II I employees was given in a .full-page spread in the Lynn River 
i jWorks News of May 27, 19.55. A picture spread, it showed the 
\ways that information is disseminated. Said the copy: 
I All the facts, all the time. That 1 s what GE employees 
I want and that's what the Company is trying to provide. 
11 . In response to this employee interest in obtaining full 
i information about the Company, its policies and 
! practices, stepped up communications programs have been 
initiated at all GE plant locations. 
I 
II 
Some of the means used in the program at Lynn are: 
.Local weekly GE radio programs discussing significant 
company events and developments 
.Bulletin board notices 
.Letters and bulletins to the homes of employees--this 
is used mostly for bringing up-to-date information on 
bonus status and benefit programs to workers 
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.Informative meetings held on a regular basis in different 
departments to establish a means of two-way communication 1 
I .River Works News, containing a special feature called 
I "I 1 d Like to Know" in which employees get the answers 
1 
I in print to questions about the company. !I 
l With a system of communications in operation in all of its 
I plants, GE is in an ideal position to bring home to its emplo~ 
1 the reasoning behind its feelings on any issue. Its employees 
I 
1 know how it feels about the GAW, and so far there has been no 
I ,, 
ij apparent problem with workers themselves on this score. 
!1 Apparently, the union leadership has not been willing to 
!gamble on a strike for this issue, either. Whether or not, 
!i 
I 
as mentioned before, GE 1 s excellent system of communications 
on its steady work goals is meant to be an answer to GAW, it 
seems from a study of the material available that it could very 
w.ell be the answer should the company want to utilize it 
as such. 
l PUBLIC RELATIONS PROGRAMS TO FIGHT GAW 
I The Maytag Company 
I 
I 
I 
General Electric has said that if and when it thought 
that its employees really were convinced that they wanted a 
guaranteed annual wage, it would wage an all-out campaign 
against what it considers to be wrong. The presumption is 
that it might even take a strike to hold out for principlets 
I
. sake. 
, It has not had to do this, but another company has had to, 
I 
I and did take a strike of 67 days over the issues of supplementa 
,I unemployment compensation and the union shop. 
! The Maytag Company, manufacturer of home appliances, 
I 
I employs approximately 3,600 workers in three plants; two in 
I Newton, Iowa, and the other in Hampton, Iowa. Its president, 
Fred Maytag II, is strongly opposed to both GAW and the union 
I shop. When the UAW, to which about three-fourths of the 
1
1
11 company's employees belong, urged its locals t~ seek the same 
kind of contract as signed with the major automobile companies, 
the scene was set for a battle. 
I I publicly that any form of GAW was wrong. 
~ 1 aware of the position of Maytag Company in Newton. The combine 
- \, II population of Newton and Hampton is about 15,000, and the 
_________Jicompany's position in the community and its strength as opposed 
Certainly the union was aware that Mr. Maytag had said 
It must also have bee I 
\ 
II 
I 
l1 
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~~ to the local union differed greatly from that of any of the 
i automobile companies. 
I 
I And, unlike the automobile manui'acturers, Maytag took its 
fight directly to its employees. A continuing community rela-
tions program has been maintained by the company. Some 
I similarity may be seen in Mr. Maytag 1 s relationship with his 
I workers and that of Fred Crawford of Thompson Products, whose 
I 
11 approach to bargaining issues was discussed in the introduction 
· to this section. 
Early in 1955, long before negotiations were slated to 
i begin, both Mr. Maytag and E. F. Scoutten, vice president and 
I 
i 
I 
director of industrial relations, had gone on record in 
\ opposition to GAW. Mr. Scoutten spoke at one of the management 
\ conferences on GAW sponsored by the NAM, and Mr. Maytag was 
~~ chairman of a panel session at another or that group • s meetings. 
i In addition, Scoutten spoke at community meetings in Newton, 
I 
facing such groups as Kiwanis and Rotary. 
I 
made at the Maytag shareowners II A speech by Scoutten was 
Jlmeeting held in March, 1955. In this speech he said: 
il 
I 
Less than 25 per cent of the workers in the United States 
are represented by organized labor unions. The great mass 
of workers in this country are oftentimes overlooked 
because they do not have a high-priced public relations 
staff to plead their cause in the press and to the 
American people •••• Sometimes ••• American managements are 
pressed into agreements such as this newest proposal of 
the UAW-CIO which are contrary to the best interests of 
this country, the American people, and in fact, the very 
employees in whose behalf this program is adopted. 
=====I~================================~F=== 
II 
,I 
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II 
i 
I
I.' 
He continued: 
If any of the major automobile manufacturers negotiate 
this proposal or a modification of it, it may safely 
be assumed that the rest of the automobile industry 
will very quickly fall into line and negotiate almost 
identical programs •.• The fatalities will occur among 
the smaller, independent manufacturers who, in signing 
such agreements, are almost certainly signing their 
own death warrants. 
This speech was reproduced in booklet form and given to 
shareholders. It was also distributed in plant reading racks 
I 
1 and employees later received a copy of the speech through the 
j mail. Coverage of the same talk was giVet;l. in the Maytag 
1
1
. Bulletin (the weekly newspaper) after being presented to the 
Maytag Management Club. 
In his speech before the NAM in July, 1955, Mr. Scoutten. 
became somewhat of a prophet when he said: 11 Industries should 
resist the slow rot which will result from the negotiations 
I recently concluded in Detroit, even to the penalty of accepting 
I a strike, if your employees elect to strike. 11 
1
1,1 
the July 28 issue of the Bulletin, and on August 18 the paper 
An announcement that negotiations had begun was made in 
' 
r mentioned that a letter had been mailed to all employees 
explaining the companyts offer to the union. The contract was 
due t9 expire on August 31. 
As negotiations continued and the expiration date of the 
contract draw nearer, Mr. Maytag sent a second letter to 
employees comparing the proposed wage rates with those of 
competitors in the home appliance industry. Meanwhile the 
union membership authorized their officers to call a strike 
if necessary. 
The September 1 Bulletin carried news of the opening of 
j the strike on the expiration of the contract. The union had 
II 
'asked Mr. Maytag to sit in on negotiations, but he declined 
to do so. 
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The next weekts issue of the paper carried pictures of the 
I picket lines, and an announcement that pay checks could be 
J picked up at the plant gates. The Bulletin, normally given 
!I to employees at the plant gates, was mailed to the homes of 
I 
workers during the strike. 
, With the strike in its second week, members of the UAW 
I International arrived to arrange for food vouchers to be distri-
11 buted. 
I the strike fund set up by the UAW at its March convention. The 
Maytag employees thus were receiving the benefits of I 
~~· union published its demands in an ad in the local paper with an 
open letter to President Maytag. The battle for public support 
i 
of the strike was on. 
The company utilized the stoppage of production to conduct 
I training classes for supervisors in all phases of the companyts 
I operations. The union, at the same time, called :for a general 
1 membership meeting which was addressed by Pat Greathouse, 
I 
1 Chicago regional director of the UAW. It was estimated that 
i 
I workers were losing an estimated $50,000 a day in wages because 
II 
II 
of the strike. 
In his speech to the union membership Greathouse stressed 
q 
lj II 
I 
I 88 
II the importance of' the GAW and union shop 
'I to employees was mailed by the president 
issues. Another lette 
in which he stated 
1 that if'·the union would withdraw demands :for both GAW and the 
I union shop~ the company would make increased of'f'ers in other 
I areas. 
I t 1The :future course of' the negotiations is up to you~ n 
1 he told the workers. 
I Noted in the September 29 issue of' the Bulletin was the 
I :fact that Western Tool and Stamping Company of' Des Moines 
I had settled its strike a:rter the union withdrew its demand :for 
the guaranteed annual wage* 
As the strike moved into its sixth week~ the president 
11 benef'i ts. He also asked that union members be allowed to vote 
I 
on whether or not to accept his of'f'er. 
The attempt to win public :favor continued with both compan I 
I I and union utilizing ads in the town newspaper to state their 
' I !views. A membership meeting called by the union reportedly had 
I 
II 
I produced a motion to allow members to vote on the of'f'er~ but the 
I 
li motion had allegedly been ruled out of' order. Instead, the 
., 
I !I union asked :for reopening of' negotiations and again demanded 
II that Mr. Maytag participate in the discussions. 
h 
r Apparently the :failure to get a membership vote on the 
I company of'f'er, plus the hardship of' the strike, induced a number 
of company employees, all except one union members, to organize 
a ttright-to-vote 11 committee. This committee set up an office, 
rented a post office box, and secured legal counsel. 
After running an ad in the local paper and sponsoring a 
I half-hour radio show on KCOB, members of the 11right-to-vote 11 
/ committee were indicted by the union and accused of attempting 
i 
I 
I to organize a nback to work movement • 11 Violence entered the 
I 
I 
1 picture when a stone was thrown through the window of the home 
I 
'I of the chairman of the committee. 
I 
But eventually the committee won out in its fight to get 
j a vote taken on the company offer, and in a meeting on November 
I 6 union members voted 808 to 696 to accept the company proposal 
I and end the strike. The contract called for a wage increase, 
I I liberalized vacation benefits, an extra paid holiday, and 
I pension and insurance agreements modeled after the Ford Motor 
Company 1 s plans. 
Although no GAW appeared in the contract, only a one-year 
I agreement was signed and the current contract expires on 
1
1 
November 7, 1956. "When asked if GAW was expected to come up 
, again in 1956, a company spokesman said that it was impossible 
j to tell how strong a demand would be made. It is safe to assume 
! that the company 1 s attitude on the subject hasn't changed a bit. 
The company used every means at its disposal to convince 
4lt employees that it would not budge on the GAW issue and in the 
long-run made its point. Even pressure from the international 
!union officers was not enough to convince the rank and file 
I~====================================F==== 
I 
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!worker that he should endure hardships to secure a job against 
ia layoff he might never have to face. 
i As with the Ford agreements there are critics of the way 
)that Maytag handled the situation. A 67-day strike and its 
!repercussions are not small items for a company to face. But 
I I there is no comparison with the competitive position of Maytag 
I 
!and that of Ford when it was going through its negotiations. 
lrn addition, many Maytag workers resented the interference of 
!!international officers in a situation which they regarded as 
'!strictly a local issue. In the final ana~~sis the company's 
!reputation as a good employer probably contributed a great deal 
jto ending the strike. 
ITimken Roller Beari~ Company 
i 
1 The campaign for public and employee support of the stand 
ltby the Timken Roller Bearing Company of Canton, Ohio against 
l the GAW began in November, 1953. At that time it appeared that 1 
I the Steelworkers would make GAW a major issue for the 1954 
I 
I 
(negotiations. 
) Although the company stopped its campaign in May, 1954 
!when it became known that the Steelworkers were not making GAW 
a major demand, Timken picked up its efforts in the latter half 
j of 1955--after the Ford settlement. 
I Chief arm of the campaign was a series of full-page ads 
lwhich the company placed in plant city newspapers in Ohio. 
I 
iThe ads went right to the point. Said one: 
l 
'I 
l 
\ 
! 
! 
I 
II 
II 
i 
I 
II I. 
II 
I 
I 
Everyone wants security. But which will make you 
more secure--money in your own bank account or 
money in an account others are free to draw on 
before you? You've worked for your seniority. Do 
you want to take .. on a new dependent every time a 
new employee is hired by the Timken Company? Or 
do you thin1c that new men should earn their . 
security and their seniority the same way you did? 
You probably won 1 t have a chance to vote on this 
issue directly. -Your union officials have already 
made up your minds for you. But thatts only their 
decision, not yours. You still have several months 
in which to speak up. Decide what you think is 
best for you--then make your feelings known. 
The themes recurrent in the ads (a total of 15 different 
I ads were run) were: don't put your money in somebody else's 
r 
! 
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I bank account; do you want someone else to handle your husbands' 
I. pay check (directed to wives); and should high seniority workers 
I 
help pay the newcomers? 
Particularly pointed arguments were used to get the 
jl employee thinking about the issue in his terms: 
/ Supposedly the Timken Company would be putting up the 
I
, money, not you. But regardless of whether the Company 
puts the money into a fund in your befualf or you put 
it in yourself, the fund would be made up of money I that is paid for your servic~s. Your money. 
I 
( 
I 
'Who would benefit from a so-called 11guaranteed annual 
wageu? Most likely people who haven't even started 
working for the Timken Company yet. 
The effectivemess of the 1953-54 campaign was tested by 
I 
11 a major automotive producer who ran a survey in Canton eight 
/months after the ads stopped. Respondents gave back almost 
! So per cent identification of the ads. Comments R .. A. Wagner, 
I 
\ITimkents public relations manager: 11 This is unusually high 
\1 when e~en the best known national products get 45 to 5o per 
,, 
__ n 
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j cent identification. 1: 
In its 1955 campaign Timken branched out to national media 
such as U. S. News and World Report to announce: "As Steel 
Goes, So Goes Inflation. 11 
-
Timken believes in communicating with employees on 
collective bargaining issues, especially in the weeks preceding 
the termination of the old contract. The public relations 
department carries out these communications, as well as other 
communications to employees. 
Another organ of company opinion is the monthly magazine--
The Trading Post. A regular feature in the magazine is a 
11Memo from the President. 11 In the period of the advertising 
campaign frequent mention was made in this column of the need 
to keep prices down and the necessity for each worker to keep 
the busine~s running ahead of competitors. This kind of 
reasoning is also prevalent in GE material. 
The real test of the Timken campaign will come this year 
(1956) in negotiations with the Steelworkers. Now that the 
I steel industry has granted SUB Timken is in the same situation 
~~as Maytag was in relation to the UAW. 
I But this campaign has been waged differently. Maytag 
1 said, 11This is wrong. H Timken says, 11 It t s your money; itt s up 
I I .. 
I
I to you what you do with it. 11 This may mean that, faced with a 
I strike, Timken, however grudgingly, would grant the SUB plan 
j which the USA seeks. 
:, 
I 
' I 
It 
!I ll 
ll 
II 
I 
I 
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CHAPTER VI 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In looking at communications procedures followed in some 
companies which have been faced with the guaranteed annual wage 
as a bargaining issue, an underlying thought has been to 
formulate some of the considerations which would have to be 
kept in mind by those concerned with the public relations 
approach to be taken. 
The decision of whether or not to communicate cannot be 
made lightly. It would necessarily entail a look at all of the 
factors presen~ in a particular situation. The companies 
I
I ::~::::.inD::::~:;d:na:::o::::~:::::e:i::a::::sc::e~h::: 
outcomes have been different. 
I There have emerged, though, some of the major factors 
I I which must be considered, and which had to be taken into accouni 
1 in the compan1es mentioned in this study. They can be broken 
I down as follows: 1) the npower" position of company and union; 
12) the matter of Ttprinciple 11 ; J) the attitude on what con-
1
1 stitutes public relations; and 4} the ractors necessary ror 
union-management cooperation. 
\ It would be well at this juncture to look into each of 
I these factors, both in general terms and in the specific cases 
I which have ·been covered in the previous five chapters. 
The Power Element 
It has been said that union-management relations is not a 
static, but a dynamic, living thing wherein two groups are 
engaged in a struggle, each to protect his own interests. Out 
or this struggle should come, in the ideal sense, the best and 
I 
most workable solution for all concerned. Union representative 
are given the mandate by their members to see that employees ge 
their fair share of the profits of an organization. Management 
representatives are traditionally seeking to protect the over-
all interests of the organization, and must please not just one 
public, but several, i. e., stockholders, customers, the commu-
nity, and the employees. 
Perhaps this reason: that the union by and large needs to 
be cond.erned primarily with the interests of one group, and 
that management people are faced with the ultimate responsibil-
ity for a variety of publics, accounts for a natural barrier 
I to a quick and easy solution of all demands. 
/I As McMurry noted in his article in the Harvard Business 
~~Review,l the dynamic aspect of union-management relations usual 
I ly means that the relative power of each group is never at a 
I standstill. At one period of time, the union may be in the 
I
I 
ascendancy and in a position to drive a hard bargain; at 
I another, the company may achieve a position of strength suffi-
1 cient to dictate its own terms. 
I The factors creating the strength position of either group 
I 
1\ :I 
I 
I 
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may not necessarily be under their control. Market conditions, 
the prosperity of the nation as a whole, the competitive 
position of the company and its product, may all contribute to 
the particular situation obtaining at bargaining time. 
In the companies studied here, the power factor was notabl 
in the cases of Ford vs. the UAW; General Electric vs. the IUE; 
and Maytag vs. Local 997 (UAW). 
1 In June, 1955 the Ford Motor Company was faced with a 
II bargaining session with one of the largest unions in the 
I
I 
country. That union was headed by a dynamic, vigorous leader 
I who personally led the negotiations and who had made the 
I
I sessions not just an ordinary meeting, but a ncrusade.n 
It was a period of tough, tight competition in the auto-
! l mobile industry when a stoppage of any kind would have been 
I 
I disastrous for the company. It contained 'an element of interna 
I struggle within the union, :for the leadership o:f the UAW was 
1 being contested, and by and large, Reuther and his group were 
I 
1 more acceptable to the automobile industry than his opponents. 
1\ The element of strategy was definitely present with the 
J extension of the General Motors contract so that Ford would be 
the first company to face the determined drive by the UAW for 
its Guaranteed Employment Plan. 
1 
Although Ford has been criticized in management circles 
I 1i for n giving in11 to the union it may well be that, acting in the 
best interests of the company, it was far better to yield on 
_j the guaranteed annual wage than to lose its :fought-:for position 
I 
II · 
1,1 in the market. 
Here, the union held·the upper hand. In the case of 
I 
General Electric and IUE, the factors were almost reversed. 
Leading the negotiating team for the company was a competent 
strong executive. It might be said that his "crusaden was to 
make sure that no guaranteed wage appeared in his contract. 
This determination, coupled with an offer which was truly 
j
1
1 
beneficial to employees, proved to be too much for a union 
which had never had the prestige or the leadership which the 
I UAW could claim. 
I In the Maytag negotiations, a small local union was pitted 
It against a company whi·ch employs about one-third of the resident. 
I I of two small towns • The company is headed by an executive who 
~~~ ::r::::l:; :::n::c::ru:::nc::::::r::di:i:r::::::::: a:no:::::~ 
to aid the local union, regional union officers from Chicago 
Ji encountered resistance, not gratitude, from the employees. 
I· 
11 They felt it was purely a local matter. And in the local 
I ~~~. conte:::mt:::ep:::tn:fq::::i:; ::::tt:::::,t:: ::a:i:::;r lay. 
significant that in each of the above cases, the nwinner 11 , in 
addition to holding the cards necessary for victory--the real I I power--had added to its position a strong case with the public 
I 
1\ and with the employees involved. It has been shown that the 
drive for GAW by the United Automobile Workers entailed a 
four-year educational program designed to bring ·every member 
\, 

I 
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not willing to gamble on a strike at GE. 
. I While communications alone could not have produced the 
I 
\ (UAW) in their negotiations. 
The Matter of Principle 
I So far, the companies which have evaded the issue of GAW 
' l or SUB (those discussed here: General Electric and Maytag) have 
utilized a "moraln argument in their stands. Both have pro-
-~ 
claimed that the idea of being paid while not working is 
I
I Jtwrong. 11 It is on this basis that they have fought the issue. 
j Both have added that it is also economically unfeasible, but 
I
. the main reasoning has been moral. 
j The question has been raised in some quarters as to 
I whether or not a company should take a stand on nprinciple 11 on 
I thls issue. The dietionary definition of principle is "a funda-
l! mental truth or basic or primary law. 11 If it is a:,basic law 
I that workers shall not be paid while idle, it becomes hard to 
draw the line between unemployment compensation laws (which 
have·been approved 11 in principle 11 by most of the business 
.. 
world) and the extension of this law which the unions propose 
as SUB. 
Companies which take the principle stand say that it 
should not be as profitable f9r a man not to work as it is to 
contribute to the productivity of the nation, for·then he will 
100 
not work. On the other side, the principle as stated by the 
unions, is that the worker should not suffer because of forces 
beyond his control; that if he wants to work, he should be 
j provided with remunerative employment. This, they say, is 
I his right. 
j Both company and union are entitled to their principles. 
I Once stated, they shoul(\ be held to. The only danger is that 
11 when dealing in the abstract area of principles sometimes the 
I specific problems are overshadowed. William F. Whyte has 
I stated that: 
I Principles are precisely those things which people 
I hold to with the greatest emotional heat. We often 
j find that groups of people are able to work together 
! 
when they give their attention po practical problems 
but are unable to get along when they discuss the I principles underlying their relationship.2 
I princ::::,1:u:0:ot:o::: :::tt::: :::~: :::n:ei:a:~::, 1::u:i:: 
i be impossible to back down without a loss of face, and perhaps 
I a 1 os :n °:h:p::::: ::::::: 'G::e::l ~leutr 1 c nor Ma~ag bas 
backed down and there is no evidence that they will do so in 
the future. It is interesting to note that Timken Roller Bear-
ing Company has not made its fight against GAW on a moral basis. 
Its arguments are mainly financial and are presented to 
employees in a logical manner. If, as a result of the current 
1 Steel negotiations Timken is forced to follow a pattern in the 
steel industry, it will not be placed in an embarrassing 
position. 
i\ !I I 
! 
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I \ What Constitutes Public Relations? 
In approaching an issue like the guaranteed annual wage 
from a public relations point of view, any communications 
effort--direct or indirect--would have to be carefully handled. 
The uhowtt of the process would be most important. 
It has been pointed out in many places that understanding 
of an issue does not necessarily lead to acceptance of the 
point of view of the communicator. From a discussion of 
,· 
industrial conf'lict comes the following· statement: 
Educational messages and persuasive communications 
from management will obviously elicit quite differ-
ent reactions ranging from unquestioning belief to 
utter disbelief, depending in part on whether or 
not the views are met by telling counterclaims from 
unions or other source·s. 'Whether one interpretation 
or another is accepted will also be determined by 
the worker's own experiences and existing attitudes--
by what he-is prepared to believe, by his emotional 
attitudes toward the source of the communications 
and by the sentiments prevailing among his friends 
and fellow workers.3 
It can be seen that if a company should communicate, then, 
11 
on collective bargaining issues, it could not be sure that its 
11 position would be favorably received. In fact, some sources 
1 fear that a discussion would produce the opposite effect as a 
matter of course. 
One solution has been offered by McMurry. He maintains 
~ that a company must change the stereotype of management which 
has been prevalent among workers. He advocates a double-
barreled approach of 11 action11 and 11 communication." 
II 
/' 
I 
I In the first step the company would prove, by its day-by-
1 day actions that it is interested in its workers' welfare. 
I This can be done by finding out what the sources of irritation 
in the daily work routine are, and then as far as possible, 
1 eliminating the sources of trouble. This would entail, in many 
Jl 
I cases, a retraining of foremen to be better supervisors and 
J better communicators up and down the line. 
jl Communications, he says, can be utilized to remold the 
I 
j opinion of workers about their management. He does not say 
anything about direct communication on collective bargaining 
issues. The program he outlines is one of 11preventive labor 
I relations 11 to achieve a more balanced union-company power 
I relationship. 
I The union is able to gain concessions from management but 
1. it must be pointed out that it is the management which has the 
,I 
II power to give the concessions. The union could not get them 
[I on its own. This attempt to condition the worker to a belief 
~~that the company does not have to be bludgeoned into granting 
!I benefits takes the form of a well-integrated program of doing 
I and then talking about it. 
I 
!Union-Management Cooperation /-==-==--=-=~;;.:..;.!.~~--,_;_;....._;..._ __ _ 
The union-management relationship, then, can be seen 
largely in the power s,ense. Where this power is.held within 
reasonable bounds, the results of bargaining can be beneficial 
to the employees, in whose behalf it is undertaken in the 
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:first place. 
A criticism of General Electric's approach to bargaining 
is that in by-passing the union with communications directly 
to employees it is really undermining the union and this cannot 
do anything but worsen the relationship. This is a problem 
which will have to be solved by each company as it views its 
own situation. It must be noted, however, that GE's 1955 
negotiations were accomplished without apparent strain ahd that 
the union locals accepted the company offer with relatively 
little haggling. 
There is little doubt that most companies accept the 
presence of unlons as necessary. They must serve as a repre-
sentative o:f the individual worker who cannot, in todayrs 
industrial scene, bargain :for himself. They are the guardians 
of workerst interests and bring employee problems to the 
attention of a management which must serve several masters--
stockholders, customers and community. 
I:f, in inaugurating a communications program to reach 
employees directly a company would be harming a good relation-
ship, pause must be taken to determine the long- and short-term 
benefits of such a program. 
The can companies, discussed in this thesis, have enjoyed 
good relations with the Steelworkers :for several years. Their 
1955 contracts were signed six weeks ahead of the expiration 
date, and they were the first companies dealing with the USA 
to grant an SUB plan. 
I 
It is interesting that while there were no communications 
in these companies prior to the contracts' signing, both major 
can companies are going ahead with planned communications 
programs to explain their contracts and to bring home to 
employees the fact that the plans were granted by management. 
More liberal than the agreements in the automotive industry, 
these plans are being advocated as the best that the company 
can provide. This move may mean less pressure on the companies 
for liberalization in 1958. 
Whither SUB? 
The settlement of the recent steel strike has brought 
with it an SUB plan similar to that of the can companies. Some 
companies in the steel industry will probably not bow to a 
pattern without a f,ight. But the pattern for SUB will be 
largely settled this year. What will happen when the three-
year contracts in the automobile and other industries expire 
is another matter. On SUB's future, Business Week said~ 
But in the final analysis, the future of SUB and its 
role in 1958 bargaining in autos and in future 
bargaining in other industries will be guided by how 
John Doe benefits from it and what he thinks of it. 
Will he clamor for more? Will he feel it isn't 
worth the trouble? On answers to those questions 
depends the weight of pressure that management will 
be feeling in the years ahead.4 . 
The dynamic aspect of collective bargaining will continue 
to be evident in 1958 and an ever more alert and well-informed 
management will be required to deal with future problems on 
' 
10.5 
SUB. ~Thether or not communications are utilized to re-enforce 
a company program, more companies seem to be coming to the 
realization that they can be of help. 
In an informal survey made of t~rteen companies which 
have signed contracts in the last year embodying some form 
of SUB, the following results were received. Five out of the 
5 
thirteen did not reply. Of the eight which did only three 
had communicated at all on.the GAW issue before contract 
negotiations. Of the five which did not communicate, three 
are going ahead with communications on the issue now that the 
plans are in force. 
It is obvious from the above that the feelings on the 
value of communications in the area of collective bargaining, 
in general, and on SUB, in particular, are divided. It is 
hoped that the cases presented in the body of this thesis will 
shed some light on what can happen when communications are 
utilized and what factors might be considered if they are to 
be used effectively. 
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